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SUMMARY
Landlords and tenants are continually search­
ing for means to keep their rents up to date with 
changing prices, costs and production. Their prob­
lem arises from the inflexibilities of rental terms 
as fixed by custom and contract— coupled with 
wide variations in prices of farm products, in 
costs of land ownership and farm operation and 
in crop yields and livestock produced. This study 
was designed to discover ideas and information 
which should prove helpful to landlords and ten­
ants interested in introducing rent flexibilities into 
their farm leases. The study has three objectives :
(1) To analyze the division of net income be­
tween landlord and tenant over a period of years 
in order to determine the extent to which and the 
rapidity with which it reflects cost, price and pro­
duction changes.
(2) To determine possible reasons for rent in­
flexibilities and to analyze these reasons in terms 
of effects upon landlord-tenant relations.
(3) To develop and analyze several rent ad­
justment alternatives in terms of their weaknesses 
and strengths.
Basic information for the study was obtained 
from the farm records of tenants and landlords 
cooperating in the Iowa Farm Business Associa­
tions over a period of at least 15 years. These 
records— some of which dated from 1921—provid­
ed the basis for calculating the net returns ratios 
from 1921 through 1950. The net return ratio 
trends were related to production, price and cost 
trend data obtained from the Iowa Crop and Live­
stock Reporting Service. In addition, a sample of 
65 tenants and 25 landlords were interviewed to 
learn the possible effects of rent inflexibilities upon 
landlord-tenant relations and how they had at­
tempted to overcome these inflexibilities.
From the analysis of rents on the farms studied, 
two main deductions may be made as to why rents 
fail to keep pace with prices, costs and produc­
tion: (1) Wide fluctuations in the net rent ratios 
appeared for all kinds of rents. (2) The kind of 
rent apparently affects the direction of the trend 
in net return ratios.
Five major factors can explain both variations 
in net return ratios and direction of trends in 
these ratios. (1) Amounts and shares of rents 
become relatively fixed by custom in communities 
and resist changes necessary to keep up with 
prices, costs and production. (2) Since landlords 
and tenants contribute different kinds of resources 
as well as different amounts of the same resource, 
changes in prices, costs and production have differ­
ential impacts upon their respective contributions 
and shares (or amounts) of income. This situa­
tion is not reflected proportionately in their rela­
tive returns. (3) The duration of the rental 
contract for one or more years does not tend to 
reflect farm income changes during the life of 
the agreement. (4) Unpredictable changes in 
prices, costs and production are basic difficulties 
in keeping rents up to date. (5) Laws relating to
liens in connection with rental payments tend to 
reinforce inflexibilities in rentals.
Findings in this study coincide with trends in 
kind of rent as reported in the United States 
Census of Agriculture each decade from 1850 
through 1950.
Interviews with the 90 landlords and tenants 
revealed that they had made a total of 165 ad­
justments growing out of rent inflexibilities since 
1939. Some of these adjustments were success­
ful; most of them were either avoidable through 
lease adjustment provisions or else resulted in 
net losses to both parties.
The 165 changes made by landlords and tenants 
may be grouped into three types: (1) Changes in 
leasing provisions within the same type of lease 
and by the same landlord and tenant—included 
94 changes. (2) Changes in kind of rent by the 
same landlord and tenant—included 26 changes. 
(3) Changing farms or occupations—included 45 
changes. (Included in this third type were 10 
tenants who changed type of lease in connection 
with changes in farms.)
The interviews indicated that more flexible leas­
ing provisions could have prevented much of this 
farm change and the accompanying costs of mov­
ing and becoming adjusted to a new farm.
Three kinds of specific provisions designed to 
adjust rents to changes in income were found in 
use by landlords and tenants. One provision, a 
“base and bonus” idea, involved the determination 
of a base rent accompanied by an escalator clause 
for increasing the rent as prices of farm products 
went up. The provision has proved satisfactory 
during the last 15 years, although prices and pro­
duction have been at high levels also. The ability 
of the plan to withstand a severe change in prices 
and production has not been rigorously tested.
Another plan, a “ cash or share option” idea, pro­
vides two alternative rent-determining arrange­
ments—one cash, the other share. The tenant was 
permitted to exercise his option up to September 
1 of the current crop year. The basic weakness 
in this plan consisted of the advantage to the 
tenant by allowing him sole choice in the rent 
determination between the two alternatives. In 
recognition of this weakness, the date of declara­
tion of choice by the tenant was advanced to 
July 1.
The third plan, embracing a “ commodity price 
adjustment” idea, was in operation on nine hog- 
producing farms. This plan included (1) deter­
mination of a base rent and (2) a provision for 
adjusting the rent up or down at the rate of $0.25 
for each $1 change in the local price of hogs per 
hundredweight on a particular day. This plan 
was considered satisfactory by both landlords and 
tenants during its period of operation, 1940 
through 1952. However, crop yields were rela­
tively high during this period and no major death 
or gain loss was experienced in the hog enterprise. 
Obviously, this plan would not have made adjust-
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ments for such production failures of crops or 
livestock.
Some other proposals for rent adjustment, al­
though not found in the farmer interviews, have 
been advanced by several state experiment sta­
tions. One plan provides for rent adjustments in 
keeping with changes in the “prices received” in­
dex, including major farm commodities of the 
state. Similar to the preceding plan, this arrange­
ment starts with an agreed-upon base rent per 
farm or per acre. However, in contrast with the 
preceding plan, this plan includes all, rather than 
just one, of the major farm commodities as a base 
for farm rent adjustment. Its basic weaknesses 
are twofold. First, it does not provide for varia­
tions in production. Second, the price changes of 
all major farm commodities may not coincide with 
the prices of particular products produced on a 
particular farm.
Another proposal advanced by the state experi­
ment stations provides for rent adjustment based 
on changes in both price and production. This 
arrangement also starts with a base rent per farm 
or per acre and provides for annual adjustments 
in line with “prices received” for major farm 
commodities. In addition, this plan provides for 
adjustment in rent in terms of changes in yield 
resulting from floods, drouth, insects, disease and
similar factors beyond the control of the farmer. 
Although this arrangement is an improvement 
over the other plans, its weakness lies in not tak­
ing changing costs into account. This weakness 
also applies to preceding plans.
This study points out the nature and causes of 
rental problems created by the failure of farm 
rents to keep up with changes in farm income. 
It reveals weaknesses as well as success features 
of current attempts and proposals to improve this 
situation. From this study of the problem and 
attempted solutions, six general interrelated con­
ditions appear worthy of serious consideration by 
landlords and tenants interested in working out 
and in implementing rent adjustment arrange­
ments. The arrangement should:
• Be worked out ahead of the leasing period 
for which it is to apply, be clearly stated in 
writing and agreed to by both parties;
• Encourage efficient use of farm resources;
• Provide for changes in prices of farm prod­
ucts ;
• Provide for changes in farm production be­
yond the control of the farmer; and
• Be readily workable and not unduly complex.
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Adjusting Farm Rents to Changes in Prices, 
Costs and Production1
B y  W a l t e r  E. C h r y s t  a n d  J o h n  F. T i m m o n s 2
Farm rents, whether in the form of cash, kind 
or shares, are influenced largely by custom.3 As 
customary shares and amounts resist change, farm 
rents tend to become “ sticky” and to lag behind 
changes in prices, costs and production.4 Caught 
between the static nature of rent and the dynamic 
changes in costs, prices and production, landlords 
and tenants are continually searching for ways 
and means to adjust their rents to changing farm­
ing conditions. In response to this demand for 
rental changes, this study was conducted to in­
vestigate alternatives whereby landlords and ten­
ants may keep their rents more in line with chang­
ing costs, prices and production.
The general approach used in the study was to 
(1) delimit the scope of the problem, (2) diagnose 
the main elements of the problem and (3) develop 
ways of adjusting farm rents to changing prices, 
costs and production. Sources of evidence for 
carrying out this threefold approach were inter­
views with selected landlords and tenants, farm 
records on file in the Department of Economics 
and Sociology, Iowa State College, and indexes of 
costs, prices and production for Iowa.
I m p o r t a n c e  o f  R e n t i n g  t o  I o w a ’ s  A g r ic u l t u r e
A majority of Iowa’s farmers (53 percent) rent 
all or part of the land they operate, according to 
the 1950 Census of Agriculture. In terms of farm­
ers, 107,765 of the state’s 203,159 farmers rent 
all or part of their land. In terms of land, 53 
percent, or slightly more than 18 million acres, 
are rented. In terms of production, more than 
half, or around 1 billion dollars’ worth of agri­
cultural production, came from rented lands in 
1950. The estimated value of rented land in the 
state is around 3.6 billion dollars. Consequently,
iProject 1043, Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station.
Production Economics Research Branch, Agricultural Research Serv­
ice, United States Department of Agriculture and Department of Eco­
nomics and Sociology, Iowa State College, respectively.
3The term “ farm rent”, as used in this report refers to kinds and 
amounts of payments landlords receive for their land and other contri­
butions to the operation of rented farms. Farm rents may be expressed 
in the form of cash per acre, a share of the crops, a share of the live­
stock, a fixed amount of crops or livestock, or some combination of 
these forms.
^Throughout this report, prices refer to products sold; costs refer to 
expenses and factors purchased; and production refers to the total 
physical output of the farm as influenced by natural conditions (such 
as weather, insects and disease) and technological changes.
from the viewpoint of number and proportion of 
farms, acres of land, value of land and agricul­
tural production, rented lands are very important 
in the state’s agriculture.
Of equal importance to tenants, landlords and 
the public is the way in which these lands are used, 
the way in which the agricultural production is 
achieved, the level of farm production and the di­
vision of returns from this production between 
landlords and tenants. These factors are condi­
tioned to an important degree by the rents re­
ceived and paid by landlords and tenants, respec­
tively.
T h e  P r o b l e m  o f  “ S t i c k y ”  R e n t s
The “ sticky” character of farm rents caused 
by custom and contract fails to reflect changes 
in costs paid for factors, prices received for prod­
ucts and production affected by natural and tech­
nological conditions. Consequences of “ sticky” 
rents failing to reflect these changes result in two 
major problems. First, landlords and tenants may 
not receive the productivity resulting from their 
respective contributions. Thus, resources at their 
disposal may not be allocated in a way necessary 
to maximize the aggregate output of the farm. 
Second, disagreements and conflicts between land­
lords and tenants may develop and result in ter­
minating the rental relationship. This, in turn, 
leads to (1) costs of moving and finding a new 
farm by the tenant, (2) costs of finding a new 
tenant by the landlord, (3) reduction in income 
while tenants are becoming adjusted to new farms,
(4) disorganization of rural communities due to 
tenants moving about and (5) losses in agricul­
tural production to the public, both currently and 
in the future, since tenure mobility is an impor­
tant obstacle to soil conservation.5 This study is 
concerned with lessening such costs insofar as 
they are caused by farm rents failing to keep in 
line with changing costs, prices and production 
conditions.
A rent determined as satisfactory to both land­
lord and tenant in a particular year for a certain
5The effects of tenant mobility and reduced planning horizons upon 
erosion control measures was emphasized in a recent study in western 
Iowa. See: John C. Frey. Some obstacles to soil erosion control in 
western Iowa. Iowa Agr: Exp. Sta. Res. Bui. 391. 1952.
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farm may cease to remain satisfactory unless it 
is adjusted to changing costs, prices and produc­
tion. As changes in costs and prices vary consid­
erably with respect to the kinds of contributions 
made by each party, rents become out of line with 
the original agreement. For example, land costs 
(such as taxes) continue upward after prices of 
farm products have turned downward. Also, oper­
ating costs (such as machinery, fuel and labor) 
remain high after prices of farm products have 
turned downward.
In general, land costs are more rigid than costs 
pertaining to crop or livestock production. For 
example, in periods of rising prices, farm wages 
rise more rapidly and peak earlier than taxes. 
In periods of falling prices, wages fall both faster 
and farther than taxes. If the landlord bears the 
tax and the tenant pays for hired labor, the lack 
of proportional change in these costs will tend 
to increase the net return of one party relative to 
the other. Thus, in a period of rising prices, it 
could be expected that the tenant’s costs would 
advance more rapidly than the landlord’s costs, 
and, with the same division of gross returns, the 
landlord would get a greater share of the net 
return. Conversely, in a period of declining prices, 
the landlord’s net return would tend to decrease 
relative to the tenant’s net return.
In a share agreement, a fall in prices will have 
the same relative effect on the gross income of 
each party. But expenses are not borne in the 
same ratio as the product is divided; a change in 
price will result in a change in the net return 
ratio of landlord and tenant.6 With respect to 
the cash lease, changes in prices may have an even 
more pronounced effect upon the division of net 
returns. To the extent that changing prices are 
not reflected in the cash rent, only the gross and 
net income of the tenant is affected, and this must 
result in changes in the net return ratio.
Changes in production can also affect the net 
return ratio. Crop and livestock losses because 
of drouth, flood, insects or disease result in an 
unequal net income incidence on the two parties. 
Benefits of conservation improvements may go in 
part to the landlord, with the tenant bearing, 
initially at least, the increased cost. Production 
decreases through acreage limitations or market­
ing quotas may also affect the net return ratio. 
Previous experience with acreage reduction pro­
grams has indicated that, through increased ap­
plication of capital and labor (for example, in­
creased fertilizer applications and/or more wide­
spread use of improved seeds), the total product 
may not be reduced.7
Thus, for a share-type lease, the tenant’s costs 
may be increased and the landlord’s costs lowered,
6The net return ratio, as defined and used throughout this bulletin, 
is the landlord’s net return as a percentage of the total net return to 
the farm. The net return ratio is used as a measure of relative change 
rather than a measure of absolutes of income and contributions. The 
method of computation is discussed in more detail later in this bulletin.
7See: T. W. Schultz. Production and welfare in agriculture, pp. 143ff. 
Macmillan Co., New York. 1949. Prof. Schultz points out that an 8- 
percent reduction in corn acreage in 1937, 1938 and 1939 in the six 
central Corn Belt states was accompanied by a 17-percent increase in 
corn production.
with the landlord’s net return increasing relative 
to the tenant’s net return. Effects of acreage con­
trol are even more pronounced for the cash-rent 
lease. Cash rents lag behind changes in prices, 
costs and production with the result that the land­
lord’s gross returns change slowly while his costs 
decline and the tenant’s costs increase. On the 
basis of these differential changes in costs, it 
would be expected that the net return ratio would 
increase.
The foregoing changes in costs, prices and pro­
duction appear to be the basic reasons for mal­
adjustments in the net return ratios. They cause 
landlords and tenants to search for ways to make 
compensating adjustments in their rental provi­
sions.
O b j e c t iv e s  o f  T h i s  S t u d y
To develop an understanding of this problem 
and of possible rent adjustment measures, the 
objectives of this study were to: (1) find the 
division of net income between landlord and ten­
ant relative to changes in prices, costs and pro­
duction, (2) assess the effects of these changes 
upon landlord-tenant relations and (3) analyze 
remedial measures for adjusting rents to changes 
in costs, prices and production.
The steps used in carrying out these objectives 
were to: (1) determine variations in net returns 
to landlords and tenants under particular types 
of rent over a period of years, (2) determine vari­
ations in net returns to landlords and tenants un­
der several types of rent at a particular time, (3) 
determine the effects of variations of net returns 
to landlords and tenants upon the landlord-tenant 
relationships, (4) find out and appraise the kinds 
of measures currently used by landlords and ten­
ants to introduce flexibilities into rent-determin­
ing features of their rental arrangements and (5) 
develop means whereby landlords and tenants may 
keep fluctuations of divisions of net income within 
the limits of variation they desire.
H y p o t h e s e s  f o r  D ir e c t i n g  T h i s  S t u d y
This study proceeds with the development of 
three types of hypotheses as the directors of the 
inquiry. First, delimiting hypotheses were used 
to delimit the specific problem to be analyzed in 
this study from the broader problematic situation 
of rental difficulties. Second, diagnostic hypoth­
eses were used to appraise the elements which 
caused the problem as well as the elements which 
tend to alleviate the problem. Third, remedial 
hypotheses were used to develop means whereby 
the success elements may be strengthened and the 
failure elements overcome.
Delimiting hypotheses for this study are: Be­
cause farm rents do not adequately reflect changes 
in costs, prices and production, landlord-tenant 
relationships are subject to severe stresses, con­
flicts and terminations. A companionate hypoth­
esis is that these stresses, conflicts and termina­
tions can be lessened or alleviated if provisions
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are made in farm leases for keeping rentals up to 
date with changing costs, prices and production.
Diagnostic hypotheses are: Changes in prices, 
costs and production result in changing net return 
relationships between landlords and tenants for 
different lease types. Also, for any one lease type, 
changes in costs, prices and production result in 
divisions of net returns not anticipated by the 
parties at the time the original rental agreement 
was made. Furthermore, the resulting division of 
net returns becomes partially or wholly unsatis­
factory to one or both parties as the net return 
ratio exceeds the margins or zones of tolerance.8
Remedial hypotheses are: If landlords and ten­
ants have sufficient knowledge of the effects of 
changes in prices, costs and production upon the 
division of net returns under various kinds of 
rents, they will be in a position to select lease 
provisions necessary to keep their rent in line 
with changing conditions. Also, if the two parties 
are aware of possible adjustments which may be 
used in leases to keep rents up to date, they will 
be in better position to make such modifications 
as they feel necessary to provide for a more sat­
isfactory division of returns from year to year. 
These are the kinds of provisions^ which landlords 
and tenants currently seek in their efforts to keep 
farm rentals up to date with changing conditions.
P r o c e d u r e s  U s e d  t o  T e s t  T h e s e  H y p o t h e s e s
Procedures used in this study centered around 
(1) obtaining the evidence necessary to test the 
above hypotheses, (2) analyzing it in terms of 
testing the hypotheses and (3) summarizing re­
sults of these tests as a basis for enlarging the 
range of choice of lease provisions by landlords 
and tenants and as a basis for further study.
SOURCES OF EVIDENCE
Evidence for testing the several hypotheses was 
obtained from five sources: (1) farm records of 
tenants cooperating with the Iowa Farm Business 
Associations, (2) interviews with these tenants 
and their landlords, (3) related research studies, 
(4) United States Census of Agriculture reports 
and (5) cost, price and production data on file in 
the Iowa Crop and Livestock Reporting Service.
Sources of evidence used to test the three groups 













8Zones of tolerance, as developed in subsequent sections, consist of 
variations in net rent ratios from the original net rent ratio which 
landlords and tenants will tolerate before resorting to changes in lease 
provisions or lease types, or termination of relationship. The margins 
of tolerance are the limits of the zones of tolerance. Factors influencing 
the margins of tolerance are discussed later in this bulletin.
SELECTION OF SAMPLE FOR INTERVIEWS
To obtain evidence for testing the delimiting 
hypotheses, tenants who had made various types 
of lease changes were interviewed. The object was 
to learn whether these changes were a result of 
the parties’ inability to make their leasing con­
tract sufficiently adjustable to provide a division 
of the net return satisfactory to both. Tenants 
and landlords, over a period of time, have several 
possible alternatives open to them. They may: 
(1) make no change in lease type; (2) change 
lease types including (a) cash to crop- or live­
stock-share, (b) crop-share to cash or livestock- 
share or (c) livestock-share to cash or crop-share; 
(3) change rented farms or occupations by ten­
ants and change tenants or investments by land­
lords or (4) for tenants, buy farms and become 
owner-operators and, for landlords, sell or oper­
ate their farms.
Interviews were obtained with 65 record-keep­
ing tenants and 25 of their landlords who made 
76 of.the changes listed above (table 1).
For each of the nine change alternatives listed 
above, an effort was made to interview 16 tenants 
and their landlords who had made that type of 
change. But, for some alternatives, 16 potential 
respondents were not available. If more than 16 
changes of a particular change type were made, 
a random sample of 16 was drawn; if less than 
16 changes were made, the total number avail­
able were interviewed. In addition to those who 
had made changes in lease type, 16 tenants who 
made no changes in lease type were interviewed 
to learn what changes, if any, had been made in 
lease provisions to keep abreast of economic con­
ditions.
INFORMATION SOUGHT AND SCHEDULE USED9
Detailed schedules covering the period 1939 to 
1950 were obtained from landlords and tenants. 
The schedules were designed to provide informa­
tion in the following basic areas: (1) changes in 
lease provisions or type made between 1939 and 
1950, (2) whether changes were a result of 
changes in prices, costs or production, (3) ap­
praisal of each change as a remedy for the con­
ditions originating the change, (4) effect of the 
change, or the need for change, on landlord-tenant 
relations and (5) desirability of holding the di­
vision of net returns within a certain range of 
variability (or zone of tolerance).
PURPOSES AND KINDS OF RENTS IN 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
P u r p o s e s  o f  R e n t
Farm rent has three important purposes. First, 
it helps allocate resources among particular kinds 
and amounts of uses in the productive process.
9Schedule forms (blank) used in interviewing landlords and tenants 
may be obtained from the Department of Economics and Sociology, Iowa 
State College.
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TABLE 1. INITIAL AND FINAL CLASSIFICATIONS O F INTERVIEWS WITH 65 TENANTS AND 25 LANDLORDS.
Type of change
No change










(number) (number) (number) (number) (number) (number) (number) (number) (number)
Expected*............................................................................ 10 1 10 6 9 8 10 16 16
Rejected!............................................................................ 1 1 1 2 0 2 0 0 2
Transferred into class.......................................................... 0 0 1 0 1 0 5 1 4
Transferred out of class...................................................... 5 0 0 2 1 3 0 1 0
Completed |......................................................................... 4 0 10 2 8 2 13 12 16
Un visited §........................................................................... 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 2
Lease changes found in addition to change sought**......... 0 C 0 0 0 0 7 3 0
Total changes studied......................................................... 4 0 10 2 8 2 20 15 16
1 0 0 4 2 3
Landlords interviewed!J..................................................... 3 0 2 0 0 1 7 4 8
Total interviews! §....................................... ...................... 8 0 12 6 10 6 27 19 24
* The number of changes of a given type expected upon the basis of information available from the farm record-keeping accounts. An effort was 
made to obtain 16 changes of each type. If the farm records indicated that less than 16 changes of a specified type had occurred,, all were included 
in the sample; if more than 16 changes were observed, 16 were drawn at random.
f  The elimination of a sampling observation after interview disclosed the failure to make the specified change.
t  Original sampling observations for which schedules were completed.
§ Original sampling observations for which schedules were not completed by reason of inaccessibility.
** Changes in tenure status disclosed by interview in addition to change contained in sample.
f t  A change in lease type accompanied by a change in farms.
$} The number of landlords who were a party to the change and who were accessible for interview.
§§ Interviews associated with a specific type of change. As some respondents had made more than one type of change, the number of inter­
views is greater than the number of respondents.
Second, it distributes returns between landlord 
and tenant from the joint use of their combined 
resources. Third, farm rent helps to keep land­
lords and tenants working together as teams 
which is necessary in the continued joint use of 
their combined resources.
THE PRODUCTIVE FUNCTION
Resource allocation is at an optimum, in terms 
of maximum farm output, when marginal value 
product equals the marginal cost of resources con­
tributed. One important function of farm rent 
is to encourage use of resources contributed by 
landlord and tenant in such a way that this ob­
jective of resource allocation will be realized in 
the interest of increasing farm production for the 
mutual benefit of both parties and the public. The 
allpcative function of rent and conditions under 
which this function may be achieved has been 
analyzed in a number of current studies. It is not 
developed further in this report.10
The productive function of rent is closely relat­
ed to but beyond the immediate scope of this re­
port. This study assumes that the initial rentals, 
affecting the productive and distributive functions, 
were satisfactory to both parties as the basis for 
the original bargain.
THE DISTRIBUTIVE FUNCTION
The second function of farm rent is to distribute 
returns in relation to the productivity of resources 
contributed. This function is closely allied to the 
productive function which requires each contrib­
utor of resources to receive full benefit for the 
part of the production that results from his re-
10See: D. Gale Johnson. Resource allocation under share contracts. 
Jour. Political Econ. 58:111-123. 1950. Rainer Schickele. Effects of
tenure systems on agricultural efficiency. Jour. Farm Econ. 23:185-207. 
1941. Earl O. Heady. Economics of farm leasing systems. Jour. Farm 
Econ. 29:659-678. 1947. Louis S. Drake. Comparative productivity
of share- and cash-rent systems of tenure. Jour. Farm Econ. 34:535-550. 
1952.
spective contribution. If all returns were shared 
exactly alike and all resources were contributed 
equally, there would be no problem of adjusting 
farm rents to prices, costs and production; these 
changes would be automatically reflected in the 
distribution of returns. But contributive shares 
of the major productive resources—land and labor 
—are not shared «alike because each party needs 
the other’s resources, complementary to his own, 
to operate the farm. Furthermore, particular re­
sources contributed by each party react differ­
ently to price and cost changes. These conditions 
mean that farm rents must be adjusted to reflect 
changes in costs, prices and production in an effort 
to keep rents in line with the initial rental agree­
ment.
THE TEAMWORK FUNCTION
Since renters and their landlords need each 
other’s resources to operate farms, the interests 
of landlords and tenants are largely complement­
ary. Farm rents are a major factor in facilitat­
ing or obstructing this complementary nature of 
interests. Full cooperation between landlord and 
tenant is essential in achieving the productive 
and distributive functions of farm rent. To main­
tain this cooperation, provisions must be made for 
keeping farm rents abreast of changing condi­
tions of prices, costs and production.
This study does not try to assess the efficacy of 
either the productive or distributive functions of 
rents at the time the original rent was determined. 
Apparently, the original rent was satisfactory to 
both parties or the parties would not have reached 
an agreement on the joint use of their respective 
resources in the operation of the farm. The orig­
inal rent provided a common basis for building 
their relationships in operation of the farm. The 
study reported here is concerned with maintain­
ing this relationship by making the changes in 
farm rent needed to keep the division of returns
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in line with the intended division of net income 
at the time of the original agreement.11 It de­
velops the thesis that a satisfactory division of 
returns will not remain satisfactory unless it is 
adjusted from time to time because of the constant 
operation of changing factors beyond the control 
of either party. Unless these adjustments are 
made in an appropriate manner, the most satis­
factory landlord-tenant relationship may deteri­
orate into conflict or termination through no fault 
of either landlord or tenant.
Neither the productive nor the distributive 
function of rent may be determined precisely for 
any particular farm, even though the necessary 
conditions and assumptions may be explicitly stat­
ed. Until these determinations can be made, and 
even thereafter, the problem of maintaining satis­
factory relations among landlords and tenants 
rests largely upon (1) a reasonable value concept 
of rent as determined by the landlord and tenant 
at the time their relationship commences, (2) 
limits of toleration in net income variations 
around this original reasonable value and (3) ad­
justments necessary to keep farm rents within 
these limits of variation from rent norms accept­
able to both tenant and landlord.
Although farm rent is the heart of the rental 
arrangement, many other provisions affect the 
successful operation of the farm. These include 
provisions for renewal, termination, improve­
ments, land use practices and the many other 
points to be considered in providing for the suc­
cessful operation of rented farms.
Rental arrangements are regarded in this study 
from two viewpoints. First, they may prevent 
farm rents from reflecting changes to a degree 
necessary for the continuation of the rental re­
lationship. Second, the rental arrangement pro­
vides the potential means whereby adjustments 
in farm rents necessary to the continuing joint 
operation of the farm may be made.
K i n d s  o f  R e n t
Five major kinds of rent are paid by Iowa ten­
ants as reported in the 1950 United States Census 
of Agriculture. These are cash, crop-share, crop- 
share plus some cash, livestock-share and other 
kinds (including fixed quantities of production, 
profit sharing and other combinations). As re­
ported in the 1950 Census of Agriculture, nearly 
half (46 percent) of the state’s tenants pay a 
combination of crop-share and cash as rent (table 
2). The next most frequent kind of rent is a 
share of the livestock and crops, paid by 23 per­
cent of the tenants. Seventeen percent pay only 
cash as rent; 8 percent pay a share of the crop 
only, and the remaining 6 percent use other mis­
cellaneous kinds of payment.
Hit is recognized that, in some instances, this action may be incom­
patible with the distributive and allocative functions of rent cited above. 
But there are both economic and social gains that may be obtained from 
a reduction in tenant mobility. Among these benefits are: longer 
planning horizons, reduction in soil erosion, reduced operating costs 
in the form of eliminated moving costs and breakage, community sta­
bility, continuity of the educational process and related items.
TABLE 2. TRENDS IN KINDS OF RENT PAID IN IOWA FROM 
1880 TO 1950: U. S. CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE.
Year All tenants
Proportion of tenants who paid
Cash only
Shares 
and cash Shares only Other kinds
(number) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
1880..................... 44,174 19.1* 80.9f § §
1890..................... 56,720 44.0* 56. Of § §
1900..................... 79,736 55.8* 44.2 § §
1910..................... 82,115 52.8 17.2 25.5
1920ft................. 89,064 50. Of 18.4 28.8 2.8
1930ft.................. 101,615 45.2 § § 54.8**
1940ft.................. 101,484 29.2 44.0 21.9 4.9
1950ft.................. 77,536 16.8 46.0 31.3 5.9
* Cash and unspecified.
f  Share-cash and share. # '
j  Prior to 1925, standing renters (renters paying fixed quantity of 
products) were included with cash tenants.
§ Not available.
** Includes share rents, 
f t  Census taken as of April 15.
CASH RENT
Although 17 percent of the tenants in the state 
pay only cash as rent for their farms, an addi­
tional 46 percent of the state’s tenants pay part 
of their rent as cash under crop-share-cash ar­
rangements.
Under the cash rent arrangement, the tenant 
agrees to pay the landlord a specific amount of cash 
for the use and occupancy of a particular farm 
or tract of land for a fixed period of time, usually 
1 year. The payment is made at the beginning 
or ending of the period, or partial payments are 
made during the period. Cash rents are influenced 
by custom. They resist changes from levels of 
rents prevailing in the community and from 
amounts previously paid for particular farms. 
Furthermore, cash rents are determined from 12 
to 18 months before the end of the production 
period and, hence, do not take into account changes 
in prices, costs and production no matter how 
great these changes become. In a period of rising 
farm prices, for example, cash rents even though 
renegotiated annually, tend to lag far behind. This 
means that the landlord receives a smaller share 
of the net returns. Conversely, during periods of 
falling prices, tenants receive a smaller share of 
the net returns.
CROP-SHARE PLUS SOME CASH RENT
As indicated in table 2, 46 percent of the state’s 
tenants pay a share of the crop plus some cash as 
rent. Under the crop-share and cash kind of rent, 
the landlord furnishes the farm, and the tenant 
furnishes his labor and machinery; management 
may be shared in various degrees, and both parties 
share in the crop returns. The tenant pays an 
additional rent in the form of cash for pasture, 
meadow, improvements or premium for the farm.
Although the crop-share arrangement includes 
more flexibility in farm income than the straight 
cash rent, certain basic inflexibilities are inherent 
in crop-share rents. For example, the landlord 
contributes a relatively greater part of the more 
stable expenses, such as interest and taxes, and a 
relatively smaller part of the less stable operating 
expenses, such as costs of labor, seed, fuel and
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machinery. His income comes partly from his 
share of crops and partly from a fixed cash rent. 
Thus, part of his income reflects changes in prices 
and yields and part remains constant for a given 
year.
As the landlord bears a relatively greater share 
of the less flexible costs, his expenses do not 
change so rapidly as the tenant’s. Thus, the land­
lord may receive an increasingly larger share of 
the net returns when prices are increasing. How­
ever, if the tenant markets his share of the crops 
through livestock under increasing prices, the 
landlord will receive a decreasing share of the net 
income. The more cash rent involved, the greater 
his decrease in share of net income will be.
CROP-SHARE RENT
Only 8 percent of the state’s tenants pay just 
a share of the crop as rent. Straight crop-share 
rent is more responsive to price and production 
changes than the crop-share-cash rent. The degree 
of responsiveness is equal to the importance of 
the cash segment of the rent. From the cost side, 
however, the share-rent contains the same kinds 
of inflexibilities discussed in the preceding section.
LIVESTOCK-SHARE RENT
Twenty-three percent of all tenants in Iowa pay 
a share of the livestock and crops as rent. Al­
though there are more intra-kind variations of 
rents under livestock-share than under any other 
type of arrangement, the landlord usually fur­
nishes part of the operating expenses, part of the 
livestock, some equipment contributions and the 
land.12 The tenant contributes his labor and all 
or part of the equipment, livestock and operating 
expenses. Both share in income from livestock 
and crops. Thus, livestock-share rent is more flex­
ible than the other kinds, because the sharing in 
costs, income and production is more widespead.
Despite these added flexibilities in livestock- 
share rents which permit them to respond more 
quickly and more completely to changes in costs, 
prices and production, certain basic inflexibilities 
remain. These remaining inflexibilités are caused 
largely by the response of nonshared resource con­
tributions to costs. For example, similar to crop- 
share rent, livestock-share rent landlords con­
tribute the land resources for which costs are 
sticky and lag behind price changes and cost of 
operating outlays.
OTHER KINDS OF RENT
Various kinds of rent are paid by 6 percent of 
the state’s tenants. These “other kinds” of rent 
include fixed quantities of production, such as a 
certain quantity of corn in bushels or a certain 
weight of pork or beef. Such arrangements are 
flexible in reflecting prices, but they do not em­
brace production changes. Also, responses of costs 
may be relatively inflexible because of the nature
i2The intra-kind rent variations under livestock-share arrangements 
increase because of the enlarged range of possible sharings when the 
livestock enterprise (s) becomes joint from expense and income view­
points.
of resources contributed, as discussed in the share 
kinds of rent. These “ other kinds” of rent also 
include guaranteed minimum wages to the tenant 
plus profit-sharing arrangements which contain 
inflexible elements to the degree in which income 
or costs are shared in fixed amounts.
E x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  R e n t a l  T r e n d s  
F r o m  1880 t o  1950
Since the turn of the century, three important 
trends in kind of rent may be derived from the 
census data presented in table 2. These trends 
are subject to certain limitations because of the 
lack of complete comparability in kind-of-rent 
categories between the decennial censuses.
The trend away from cash rent has been un­
broken each decade since 1900. In that year, 56 
percent of the state’s renters paid cash only for 
their farms. The big shift away from cash rents 
occurred during the 1930’s when the proportion 
of tenants paying all cash dropped from 45 to 29 
percent. This shift continued to 1950 when only 
17 percent of the tenants paid all of their rent in 
cash. The tendency of cash rent to lag behind farm 
income during the 1930’s, coupled with the Iowa 
lien law, appears to be a major factor causing 
this shift.
Another trend complementing the shift away 
from cash rents, is the increase in share rents 
which tend to be more flexible in reflecting changes 
in costs, prices and production. This trend con­
tinued in 1950, when 77 percent of all tenants 
paid at least part of their rent in shares of the 
farm production. Almost one-third of the renters, 
most of whom share livestock as well as crop in­
come with their landlords, paid rent exclusively in 
the form of shares.
A third trend in kind of rent since 1910 is the 
increase in share-cash rent—from 17 percent in 
1910 to 46 percent in 1950. Apparently it is an 
attempt to compensate landlords for costs that 
are not adequately represented in crop-share 
rents. These trends reflect efforts of landlords 
and tenants to adjust rents to changing economic 
conditions.13 The trends also illustrate attempts 
by landlords and tenants to break away from cus­
tomary rents. Both of these deductions support 
the basic thesis of this study which includes the 
need, nature and possibility of adjusting farm 
rents to economic changes.
FAILURE OF FARM RENTS TO ADJUST 
TO CHANGES IN PRICES, COSTS 
AND PRODUCTION
To fulfill the productive, distributive and team­
work functions cited above, farm rents must ad­
just to the dynamic economic environment in 
which modern farming operates. This section 
deals with measurement of the extent to which 
rents fail to adjust to a changing economy and
is it is recognized that changes in definitions and methods of enumer­
ation may have reduced the comparability of these data to some extent, 
but the observations are accepted as approximations of the situations 
prevailing in the census years.
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discusses some of the factors that contribute to 
this failure.
T h e  N e t  R e t u r n  R a t io  a s  a  M e a s u r e  
o f  I n f l e x i b i l i t y
The measure of inflexibility used in this study 
is the landlord’s net income as a percentage of 
the farm net income. This is referred to through­
out the study as the “net return ratio.” The net 
farm income is computed according to standard 
practice of the Iowa Farm Business Associations. 
It is obtained by subtracting all business debits, 
which include all negative inventory changes, 
from all business credits; these include positive 
inventory changes and the farm contribution to 
family living.14 Opportunity costs were not con­
sidered for real estate, capital or labor. The net 
farm income, computed in this way, represents 
the return to all of the resources used in the farm 
operation.15 Similarly, when the landlord’s net 
return is computed in like manner, it represents 
the return to the resources contributed by the 
landlord. The ratio between the two net returns, 
therefore, serves as a measure of the division of 
net income between landlords and tenants. If the 
ratio increases, the landlord receives a larger 
share of the total net income of the farm; if the 
ratio decreases, the tenant receives a larger share 
of the farm net income.
The net return ratio has definite limitations— 
it may range from negative values to infinity. 
It is possible, for example (particularly in the 
case of the cash lease), for the farm to have a 
negative or zero net income whereas the landlord 
may have a positive net income. Under these cir­
cumstances, a few cents difference in the net farm 
income can cause the net return ratio to move 
from a large negative value to a large positive 
value. This feature has impaired the utility of
14The real estate valuation is held constant.
15John A. Hopkins and Earl O. Heady. Farm records. 3rd ed. p. 
179. Iowa State College Press, Ames. 1949.
Fig. 1. Estimated division of net returns between landlord and tenant 
for cash, crop-share and livestock-share leases (1921-30; 1933-52).
the measure as a tool of analysis for the early 
depression years. But, under less extreme condi­
tions, the net return ratio appears to be a valid 
measure of the division of net farm income.
V a r i a t i o n s  i n  N e t  R e t u r n  R a t i o  U n d e r  
D i f f e r e n t  L e a s e  T y p e s , 1 9 2 0 -5 2
Records of tenants cooperating with the Iowa 
Farm Business Associations were investigated to 
determine the division of net return under each 
lease in periods of different levels of economic ac­
tivity. One hypothesis advanced was that periods 
of rising and falling prices and costs affected the 
division of net returns differently for each type 
of lease. To test this hypothesis, a sample of rec­
ords was drawn for each type of lease for each 
year and the net returns for the farm and for the 
landlord were determined.16
It seems appropriate to divide the 1920-52 pe­
riod into three subperiods for purposes of analyz­
ing the effects o f economic forces upon the division 
of returns between landlords and tenants. These 
periods are: (1) 1920-30 when prices displayed 
little trend but were subject to considerable vari­
ation; (2) the early depression years of 1930-34 
when prices broke sharply and remained at a level 
much lower than the one that prevailed in 1920- 
30; (3) 1935-52 when prices, in general, were 
moving higher. These three periods offer con­
siderable contrast—a period of fluctuating prices 
with little trend, a period of falling and low 
prices, and a period of rising and high prices.
CASH LEASE
The net return ratio for cash leases has been 
subject to extreme variability throughout the 
period under consideration. The average cash- 
renting landlord has received from as little as 
one-ninth of the net farm income in some years 
to as much as 100 percent plus some of the ten­
ant’s capital in other years (fig. 1).
Considering first the “ Twenties,”  the net return 
ratio was extremely variable in the forepart of 
the period. In 1921, for example, it is estimated 
that the cash landlord received 59 percent, or 
nearly three-fifths, of the net return of cash- 
rented farms. But, for the following year, his 
share of the net farm income was 19 percent, or 
less than one-fifth of the total. The next year,
1923, the landlord’s share again rose sharply, 
reaching 64 percent of the total, only to decline 
to an estimated 31 percent in the following year,
1924. Throughout the remainder of the twenties, 
the division was relatively stable in comparison 
with the early part of the period.
In 1930, as the depression period was starting,
18A sample of 10 records for each type of lease for each year was 
sought and obtained for 1929-52. In order that the division of returns 
should be as representative as possible of the lease type, only tenants who 
had not changed lease types while with the associations were used in 
this period. The reason was that those who had made no changes prob­
ably had adjusted their resources to the lease type better than those 
who had made changes. In the early years of the association, however, 
there were not enough cooperators who had not changed lease types to 
fill some of the samples, and some who had changed their form of 
tenure were used. Even using all available cases did not permit a full 
sample for some early years. The number in each sample appears in 
Appendix A.
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the cash net return ratio again rose sharply, in­
creasing from 23 percent in 1929 to 63 percent in 
1930. The net return ratio increased again in 
1931 to the point that cash-rent landlords not only 
received all of the net farm income but received, 
in addition, part of the tenant’s assets.17 The 
following year, 1932, offered no change from 1931.
In 1933, the cash net return ratio was again 
within the range of the pre-depression years, 
standing at 26 percent. From 1933 to 1952, the 
ratio showed a downward trend that declined at 
the rate of 0.7 percent per year. Two deviations 
from the trend are of interest—the high levels of 
1937 and 1938 and the low levels of the early war 
years, 1940-43. Possible explanations of these de­
viations, along with the downward trend, are 
discussed later.
CROP-SHARE LEASE
The crop-share lease, like the cash lease, showed 
considerable variability in the division of net 
returns from 1922 to 1930 (fig. I ) .18 But the 
general trend throughout the latter part of the 
period was upward, with the most pronounced in­
crease occurring in 1930 when the net return ratio 
moved from 38 percent in 1929 to 53 percent.
In 1931, the ratio again increased substantially, 
with the landlord receiving 227 percent of the net 
farm income. As with the cash rent, this was pos­
sible only because the landlord received all of the 
net farm income plus a part of the tenant’s as­
sets.19 In 1932, the situation was even more un­
favorable to the tenant; the average farm net 
income and the average tenant net income were 
negative while the average landlord net income 
was positive.20 From 1934 through 1952, there
17It is of interest to note that all cash tenants in the 1931 sample 
had a net loss, while all landlords had a net gain. The same condition 
prevailed in 1932.
18As the Iowa Farm Business Associations’ record-keeping system was 
just being established, it was difficult to obtain a sample of records 
sufficiently large to estimate accurately the net return ratio for this 
period. _ The wide fluctuations in the 1920-30 period may be due partly 
to the limited number of observations. The number of observations used 
in making the estimate for each year is shown in Appendix A.
ifilfl 1931, 7 of the 10 farmers in the sample had negative net incomes 
while all of the landlords had net gains.
2°In 1932, 7 of the 10 tenants and 2 of the 10 landlords had negative 
net_ incomes. The sums of the landlords’ net income, however, were 
positive, but the sums of net incomes of the tenants and of the farms 
were negative.
was a pronounced upward trend in the crop-share 
net return ratio, with the linear trend rising about 
0.8 of 1 percentage point per year. Deviations 
from the trend, however, are similar to those for 
the cash lease. They are discussed later.
LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASE
As with the cash and crop-share leases, the 
livestock-share lease showed wide fluctuations for 
the 1922 to 1930 period.21 But there is evidence 
that the ratio had an upward trend during the 
period, with the landlord’s share of the farm net 
income reaching 59 percent in 1930.
It is in the early depression years of 1931 and 
1932 that the livestock-share net return ratio 
stands in marked contrast with the cash and crop- 
share net return. In 1931, the average landlord’s 
net income, the average tenant’s net income and 
the average farm net income all were negative.22 
The landlord’s share of the net farm loss amounted 
to 41 percent of the total. A similar result occurred 
the following year when the landlords took 59 
percent, or almost three-fifths, of the losses from 
the farming operation.23
In 1934, the net incomes were positive and the 
average landlord’s share of the net farm income 
was about 41 percent. For the rest of the 1934-52 
period, the net return ratio showed a significant 
upward trend, with the landlord’s share of the 
total net increasing „an estimated one-third of 1 
percent per year. Again, there was substantial 
deviation from the trend in some years—perhaps, 
however, the most significant item, apart from 
the trend, is the marked decline in the ratio from 
1948 to 1952. Factors contributing to the trend 
and deviations from the trend are discussed in 
subsequent sections.
P o s s ib l e  R e a s o n s  f o r  I n f l e x i b i l i t y
Factors that affect the net return of landlords 
and tenants under various lease types are shown 
in table 3. These factors may be classified into
21 Again, this may be due partly to the limited number of observations 
available for this period.
22Nine of the 10 farms in the sample had a net loss, and 8 of the 
10 landlords had a loss.
2SIn 1932, all net incomes—farm, landlord and tenant—were negative.
TABLE 3. FACTORS AFFECTING NET RETURN OF LANDLORD AND TENANT UNDER EACH LEASE TYPE.








ProductionLivestock Grain Operating Fixed (real estate)
Cash
Tenant........................................... X X X X X XLandlord................................................................... X X x
Crop-share
Tenant............................................................... X X X X X XLandlord............................................................ X X X X X XLivestock-share
Tenant.. .................................................................... X X X X X XLandlord..................................................................... X X X X X X X
* Forces such as custom, differences in types of resources supplied by landlords and tenants and the contractual nature of rent are manifest in 
the lease provisions. The legal framework of tenure which may govern lease provisions as well as provide methods of adjusting difficulties not 
covered m the lease provisions does not lend itself to this classification.
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two types : endogenous, or those over which the 
landlord and tenant have control in the bargain­
ing process ; and exogenous, or those which arise 
from outside of the rental contract and are not 
subject to any degree of modification by either 
party. Examples of the endogenous factors may 
be found in the agreements that designate the 
quantity of each resource each party will con­
tribute, how the resource will be used and how 
the return from the resource will be divided. Ex­
amples of exogenous factors are the legal provi­
sions that form the framework within which the 
lease must be drawn, changes in prices of product 
sold and disparity of these changes, changes in 
costs of items contributed and disparity of these 
changes, and changes in production.
More specifically, there are at least five reasons 
why rental agreements do not readily adjust to 
changes in the economic environment. These are : 
(1) customary amounts and shares, (3) differ­
ences in kinds of resources contributed by land­
lords and tenants, (3) the contractual nature of 
rent, (4) state laws affecting farm rents and (5) 
unpredictable changes in prices, costs and produc­
tion. These factors are discussed in sequence.
CUSTOMARY AMOUNTS AND SHARES
It would be difficult to overemphasize the im­
pact of the custom of the community upon rental 
arrangements. The shares which the tenant pays 
as rent may be quite uniform over large areas in 
which the quality of the land may vary consider­
ably. These shares may be independent of the 
quantity of labor, capital and managerial ability 
he supplies. Over time, customary shares have 
been influenced little by changes in the price level 
or the development of new farming techniques. 
The shares have tended to remain constant while 
prices have changed violently, as they did in 1921, 
1931, 1938 and 1947.
Abrupt changes in production point up still 
more sharply the inflexible nature of farm rent. 
Yields may be reduced to half, or less, of normal 
(as in 1934 and 1936) or a partial crop failure 
(1947) may be followed by a bumper crop (1948). 
Yet the share rental arrangement, rooted in cus­
tom, remains unchanged. Similarly, in the short 
run, the cash rent is independent of production, 
and the amount becomes enmeshed in the norms 
of the community, thus making it resistant to 
economic force.
DIFFERENCES IN  RESOURCES CONTRIBUTED 
BY EACH PARTY
In general, the contributions of landlords and 
tenants are complementary, though, in some in­
stances, the responsibility for supplying certain 
factors is shared. The tenant usually supplies all 
or most of the labor and equipment while, in all 
cases, the landlord supplies the land. All of the 
items considered real property are supplied by 
the landlord, though minor exceptions may oc­
casionally be noted. The costs of supplying the 
contribution may vary by the nature of the con­
tribution when prices and costs are changing. 
The tenant’s net income is not affected by changes 
in real property costs as is the landlord’s net 
income. Similarly, the landlord’s net income is 
usually independent of the labor cost, but this 
may be an important determinant of the tenant’s 
net income. The costs of one party’s contribution 
may change more than the cost of the other’s, but 
the inflexibility of the rental arrangement may 
prevent the differential cost changes from being 
taken into account. This results in a substantial 
impact upon the division of net return.
THE RENTAL CONTRACT
The rental contract is made in advance of the 
production period. As a minimum, it must pro­
vide for the contributions of each party and the 
amount of rent, or the way in which rent is to be 
determined. These decisions and agreements 
must be made before the prices and costs that 
will prevail during the production period, or the 
output of the contributions are known. This factor 
alone introduces a lag of at least 1 year in the 
rental process. Development of the share arrange­
ment was an effort to provide for this lack of 
knowledge, but prices, costs and production can 
vary enough to impair the effectiveness of this 
type of arrangement. Some cash leases that are 
in effect contain provisions for adjusting the rent 
in the event that prices or production vary too 
widely from those expected to prevail during the 
lease term. In law, however, consideration is an 
element of offer, and offer and acceptance must 
precede performance. Thus, for all leases, the 
rent or its method of determination must be estab­
lished in advance of the production period covered.
STATE LAWS AFFECTING FARM RENTS
For the 62.8 percent of Iowa tenants who pay 
part or all of their rent in form of cash, the Iowa 
landlord’s lien law tends to reinforce the static 
nature of cash rents. Under the law, this lien is 
created automatically by statute as part of the 
landlord-tenant relationship without any provi­
sion in the lease.24 The statute gives the landlord 
a lien for his rent upon all crops grown on the 
farm, the increase in livestock born on the farm 
and upon other personal property of the tenant 
including other livestock used by the tenant or 
kept upon the farm during the term of the lease.25 
Additional liens may be established between land­
lord and tenant as part of the rental arrange­
ments. Both types of liens (created by statute 
and by agreement) can exist at the same time 
and may be expired in the same manner at the 
same time.26 A special provision limiting the
24Iowa Code, Section 570.1 (1950). For a more complete discussion 
of the Iowa lien law, see: John F. Timmons. Improving farm rental 
arrangements in Iowa. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bui. 393. January 
1953.
25Certain property of a personal nature is exempt from the lien law. 
See Iowa Code, Section 627.6 (1950) and Hipsley v. Price, 104 Iowa 
282, 73 N.W. 584 (1897) for exceptions and interpretations thereof. 
These exceptions are insignificant in terms of the needs of modern-day 
farming.
26Iowa Code, Section 570.6 (1950) and Beh v. Tilk, 222 Iowa 729, 
269 N.W. 751 (1936).
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statutory lien in the event of crop failure is dis­
cussed later in this report.27
The effect of the landlord’s lien is to make rent 
recoverable by the landlord although economic 
conditions may have changed during the rental 
term leaving the tenant in no position to pay. In 
this and other studies made at Iowa State College, 
tenants were encountered who were paying in 
1948 on cash rent contracted for 1932 and 1933. 
The law serves to reinforce the inflexible aspects 
of cash rent when the inflexibility is threatened 
by economic circumstances.
CHANGES IN PRICES, COSTS AND PRODUCTION
The factors discussed above contribute to 
changes in net return ratio by failing to per­
mit farm rents to adjust to the prevailing eco­
nomic environment. Conceptually, if prices, costs 
and production were static, the net return ratio 
under all lease types would remain static for the 
duration of the contract. Further, if prices and 
costs always changed in the same proportion, the 
net return ratio would remain the same. Produc­
tion changes always affect the net return ratio 
if the total costs and total returns are divided on 
anything other than the same basis.
Changes in prices and costs then are relevant 
to changes in the net return ratio only if the rate 
of change is disproportionate between the two 
items. Considering first the share-type arrange­
ments, for example: If the costs of the items con­
tributed by the tenant, such as fuel, repairs, labor 
and machinery, increase more in cost than items 
furnished by the landlord, such as taxes, insur­
ance and building repairs, the tenant’s share of 
the net return, as a percentage of the total, would 
be expected to decrease. Conversely, when prices 
are declining, if the costs of the items furnished 
by landlords do not decline in proportion with the 
costs of items furnished by the tenant, the tenant’s 
share of the total net return will increase.
Considering the effect of changes on the net re­
turn ratio, if the net incomes of the two parties 
are not equal, and the total return is divided 
equally, a given change in production will affect 
the smaller net income relatively more than the 
larger net income. In other words, if the unique 
condition of sharing the total cost in the same way 
that the total return is shared is not met, a change 
in production will affect the net return ratio.
The situation with the cash lease is different. 
Although the differential price-cost changes are 
present, cash rent is an added factor. If the 
changes in cash rent are not in the same ratio as 
the changes in farm prices, the net return ratio 
may be expected to vary. For example, when 
prices are rising, if cash rents do not increase 
proportionately, the tenant’s share of the net re­
turn increases relative to the landlord’s share. 
Conversely, if cash rents lag behind prices when 
prices are falling, the landlord’s share of the net 
may be expected to increase relative to the ten­
ant’s share.
27Iowa Code, Section 570.4 (1950).
Changing costs also affect the division of net 
returns under the cash lease. If changes in prices 
and cash rents were perfectly correlated, failure 
of costs to change in the same proportion as prices 
and rents alters the division of net returns. Fur­
ther, the cash net return ratio is affected in the 
same way as the share net return ratio by dispro­
portionate changes in the costs of contributions. 
If, in a period of rising prices, costs of supplying 
the land factor, taxes, insurance and similar items, 
fail to increase at the same rate as the costs of 
items supplied by the tenant (labor, fuel, machin­
ery, fertilizer, seed, feed and related needs), the 
net return ratio will increase. Conversely, when 
prices are declining, it is evident that the failure 
of costs of the items supplied by the landlord to 
decline as rapidly as those supplied by the tenant 
would tend to change the net return ratio in 
favor of the tenant.28 Changes in production, if 
not accompanied by proportional inverse changes 
in price, will affect the net return ratio of the cash 
lease. For example, a crop failure with only a 
moderate change in price may increase the net 
return ratio to 100 or more. Likewise, the net 
return ratio may be substantially reduced if a 
good crop isn’t accompanied by a proportional 
decrease in price.
That prices and costs do not change uniformly 
over time is evident from observation of the 
various price and cost series. In fig. 2, the in­
dexes of prices pajd for production factors and 
prices received for farm output, both for Iowa 
farmers, are shown for 1910 to 1950. It is apparent 
that, in general, when prices are rising, prices 
received by farmers for their products rise more 
rapidly and reach higher levels than do the costs 
of the items they have to buy. Conversely, when 
prices are declining, prices received by farmers 
for their output fall more rapidly and farther 
than the costs of the items they use in the produc­
tion process.
28The failure of rent to decline in proportion to prices is a force 
in the opposite direction, and one that usually overshadows the effect 
o f the disproportionate change in costs.
Fig. 2. Index of Iowa farm prices received and index of production 
costs (1910-50).
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Specifically, it will be observed that from 1910 
to 1918, farm prices rose sharply, no doubt be­
cause of the increase in demand engendered by 
the war. Costs of production also increased, but 
to a lesser extent than prices. In 1918 prices had 
increased 109 percent over the 1910 level whereas 
costs had increased only 89 percent. Between
1919 and 1921, however, farm prices decreased 
more than 50 percent while costs declined only 
27 percent.
Similarly, between 1929 and 1932 the price in­
dex of farm products declined more than 60 per­
cent while costs were declining 31 percent. Again, 
in 1937 to 1939 farm prices fell by 28 percent 
while the production cost index declined relatively 
little—about 6 percent.
Following 1941, farm prices and production 
costs moved upward together, with prices, in gen­
eral, slightly leading costs. But in 1948 farm 
commodity prices declined about 21 percent—the 
relative decrease in production costs was about 2 
percent.
A comparison of the index of production costs 
with taxes paid on farm real estate is of interest 
as the first is an indicator of the expenses gener­
ally borne by the tenant and the second is a meas­
ure of some of the expenses paid by the landlord. 
If costs of supplying the contributions of each 
party do not change proportionately, the net re­
turn ratio will be affected.
The prices-paid index and the index of taxes 
paid are shown in fig. 3. The relationship over 
time of these two costs is somewhat similar to 
the price-cost series discussed above. Taxes tend 
to rise less rapidly than prices paid for pro­
duction items, and they also tend to decline more 
slowly. From 1910 to 1920, taxes increased along 
with production expenses; for the decade, the in­
crease in taxes was 231 percent, and the increase 
in production expenses was 96 percent. But from
1920 to 1929, costs of production declined 20 per­
cent while taxes increased 10 percent. From 1930 
to 1933, the decline in taxes lagged behind the
decline in prices paid, although the magnitude of 
the change was about the same, 27 percent for 
both items. From 1934 through 1948, real prop­
erty taxes failed to rise as rapidly as costs of 
production; the increase in costs of production 
for the period was 154 percent as contrasted with 
a 95-percent increase in taxes. This relationship 
tends to increase the landlord’s share of the net 
return under any system of leasing.
PRICES OF CROPS AND LIVESTOCK
A relationship of particular interest to crop- 
share landlords and tenants deals with prices of 
crops and livestock. A crop-share landlord can 
market his share of the crop at current prices, 
while a tenant may market his crops through live­
stock production. To some extent he may have 
little or no alternative; the lease may specify that 
certain numbers of livestock be maintained—or 
more indirectly, he may by past experience know 
that production of livestock will help to strengthen 
his bargaining position toward the end of secur­
ing and retaining the lease of the farm.
If a tenant markets his crops through livestock, 
the effect of disproportionate changes upon the 
crop-share net return ratio is simple. If crop 
prices advance more in proportion than livestock 
prices, the landlord’s share of the net return in­
creases. Should crop prices decrease more rapidly 
than livestock prices, the net return ratio de­
creases.
In general, crop prices have both increased and 
decreased more rapidly than livestock prices (fig. 
4). From 1910 to 1918, for example, livestock 
prices rose 101 percent while crop prices increased 
141 percent; but, from 1918 to 1921, crop prices 
fell 64 percent, and the decline in livestock prices 
amounted to only 44 percent. From 1921 to 1925, 
crop prices increased 77 percent, livestock prices 
only 30 percent. Again, from 1926 to 1928, crop 
prices increased 24 percent, while livestock prices 
declined 4 percent. Similarly, from 1928 to 1932, 
crop prices declined more than livestock prices,
Fig. 4. Index of livestock and livestock product prices received and 
index of crop prices received, Iowa (1910-50).
15
but crop prices increased substantially more from 
1932 to 1937 when prices were rising. Crop prices 
dropped more than livestock prices with the slump 
of 1938, but they tended to rise more rapidly dur­
ing the war years.
The result of this relationship is to make the 
crop-share contract more favorable to landlords 
in periods of rising prices than in periods of fall­
ing prices. Conversely, the crop-share plan, for 
this and other reasons, will appeal to the tenant 
more when prices are falling than when they are 
rising.
FARM PRICES AND CASH RENTS
The chief factor in determining the net return 
ratio under the cash-rent agreement is the rela­
tionship over time between prices received for 
farm products and cash rent paid. A substantial 
decline in farm prices with little or no change in 
the level o f cash rent can result in a net return 
ratio of infinite value; correspondingly, a sub­
stantial increase in farm prices with little or no 
change in the level of cash rent can result in the 
landlord’s share of the net return approaching 
zero.
Figure 5 shows that the level of cash rents has 
not kept pace with changing prices. Here the in­
dex of prices received for farm products in Iowa is 
plotted with the index of the average cash rent 
paid per acre in Iowa. Three periods should be 
noted: (1) the price decline following 1929, (2) 
the partial recovery following 1934 and the re­
cession of 1938 and (3) the war and postwar 
period.
In the first period, rents did not turn downward 
until 2 years after the break in prices in 1929. 
Further, rents did not decline as much, relatively, 
as farm prices. Between 1929 and 1931, prices 
declined 41 percent, rents 5 percent. From 1929 
to 1932, prices declined 60 percent while rents 
were declining 22 percent.
Rents did not respond as rapidly as farm prices
Fig. 5. Index of Iowa farm prices received (1919-50) and index of 
Iowa cash rent (1924-49).
to the changing economic environment after 
1933. By 1937 prices had risen 130 percent, but 
rents had increased only 22 percent. Between 
1937 and 1939, farm prices decreased 28 percent. 
Farm rents, however, continued to rise.
In the war and postwar periods that followed, 
prices increased much more rapidly than rents; 
from 1939 to 1949, prices increased 166 percent 
while rents increased 86 percent.
Thus, throughout the period under observation, 
cash rent did not turn downward as quickly as 
prices—or go as low. Similarly, when prices 
turned upward, rent was slow to respond, and, 
once having reversed the trend, it did not rise as 
far. This is a factor of major importance in de­
termining the division of net returns under the 
cash lease.
DISPROPORTIONATE CHANGES AND THE 
CASH RATIO
As fig. 1 has shown, the period of 1929 through 
1932 was one of considerable strain on cash lease 
arrangements. In 1930 prices were 14 percent 
below the 1929 level while rents decreased only 
slightly more than 1 percent. The landlord’s share 
of the net return increased from 23 percent in 
1929 to 63 percent in 1930. In 1931 prices of farm 
products were 31 percent below the 1930 level, 
and the landlords had a positive net income while 
the net incomes of the farm were negative. But 
rent had declined only 5 percent and the landlord’s 
share of the net return was more than 100 per­
cent. All cash tenants in the 1931 sample had a 
net loss while all landlords had a net gain. In 
1932 farm prices again declined about 33 percent 
from the previous year while cash rents fell 18 
percent. The impact of this differential rate of 
change was the same as in 1931, with all tenants 
in the 1932 sample showing net losses and all of 
their landlords showing a net gain.29
Farm prices in 1933 were unchanged from the 
1932 level. Rent, lagging behind prices, declined 
23 percent in 1933, and the landlord’s share of the 
net return decreased to an estimated 26 percent. 
Farm prices in 1934-50 increased 244 percent 
while cash rents increased only 119 percent. Costs 
of production did not rise as much as farm prices 
(165 percent), and the tenant’s net income in­
creased relative to the landlord’s net income dur­
ing the period.30
29Year-to-year data on proportion of tenancy by lease type is not 
available. In 1930, however, 45 percent of all tenants were cash tenants. 
In 1936 it was estimated that 18 percent of the farmers were cash 
tenants. The reduction in the proportion of cash tenancy in this period 
has been attributed to the tenant’s inability to obtain adjustments for 
changing prices and yields. From: Rainer Schickele and Charles A. 
Norman. Tenancy problems and their relation to agricultural conser­
vation. pp. 175-181. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Bui. 354. 1937.
30The years 1937, 1938 and 1948 are of particular interest. An abrupt 
increase in the landlord’s share of the net returns occurred in 1937, 
when the estimated ratio increased from 16.48 in 1936 to 37.5 while the 
rent level remained unchanged from the previous year and farm product 
prices increased 12 percent. But the number of hogs marketed in 1937 
was 20 percent less than the number in 1936, and total receipts from 
farm marketings were 9 percent below the 1936 level. Thus, the drouth 
of 1936 apparently had its effect upon the division of net income in 
1937. Production increased in the following year, but prices declined, 
and the net income ratio remained near its 1937 level. The same gen­
eral situation occurred in 1948, when prices increased 5 percent, and 
the landlord’s share of the net increased from 11 to 21 percent. Corn 
yields the preceding year declined from 56.7 bushels in 1946 to 30-5 
bushels in 1947. The decrease in production was greater than the in-
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Following 1933, as increases in rent lagged be­
hind rising prices (fig. 5), the landlord’s share of 
the net return had a downward trend. The esti­
mated 1950 ratio was slightly more than half 
(13.89) of the 1933 ratio.
DISPROPORTIONATE CHANGES AND THE 
CROP-SHARE RATIO
Following 1926, as crop prices increased rela­
tive to livestock prices, with production showing 
little variation, the landlord’s share of the net re­
turn increased, reaching an estimated 53.08 per­
cent in 1930.31
In 1931, 7 of the 10 tenants had a net loss while 
all of the landlords showed a net gain, with the 
result that the landlord’s net income amounted to 
227 percent of the net income of the farm. The 
decrease in prices in 1931, without a proportional 
decrease in operating expenses, affected the ten­
ant’s net income more than that of the landlord.
In 1932, 7 of the 10 tenants and 2 of the 10 land­
lords had negative net incomes. The 33-percent 
decrease in farm prices, with only an 11-percent 
decrease in costs of production from 1931, appar­
ently eliminated all tenants’ net gain and resulted 
in losses for part of the landlords. Since 1933, as 
prices increased and costs of production increased 
less rapidly, there has been an upward trend in 
the division of net returns. But the division has 
varied widely from year to year.32
DISPROPORTIONATE CHANGES AND THE 
LIVESTOCK-SHARE RATIO
The landlord’s share of the net return showed a 
general upward trend from 1923 to 1930, reach­
ing 59 percent in 1930. The decline in farm prices 
from 1929 to 1930 affected the division of net 
returns less under the livestock-share lease than 
under either the crop-share or the cash lease.33 
The greater sharing of expenses and returns 
under the livestock-share plan has been an often 
cited advantage in that the division of net returns 
tends to be more stable in periods of wide price
crease in price, and, as production costs also increased, the tenant s net 
return decreased, and the landlord’s share of the net returns increased. 
(Marketings computed from data appearing on Pages 441 and 443, 
Thirty-eighth Annual Yearbook of Agriculture, Iowa State Department
of Agriculture, 1937.)
31The 1920-25 period was ignored because of the sampling variability 
referred to previously.
32Farm prices increased relative to production costs in 1933 and the 
net return ratio for that year was positive, being an estimated 29.b». 
In 1934 the net return ratio decreased substantially, possibly due to 
the decrease of 51 percent in corn yields as a result of the droutn ot 
1934. Livestock production did not change between 1933 and 1934, and 
the price increased 23 percent. The tenant’s gross income remained near 
the 1933 level, while the landlord’s gross declined with the decrease in 
yield and was not offset by the increase in price. These changes left 
the tenant with a larger share of the net farm income.
In 1935 livestock production declined 24 percent but this was offset 
by a 60-percent increase in price. The landlord’s net income, however, 
was influenced by a 78-percent increase in corn yields over 1934 and a 
48-percent increase in price. The landlord’s estimated share of the net 
returns increased from 22 percent in 1934 to 32 percent in 1935.
Another period in which the net return ratio may have been in­
fluenced by the differential rate of change between crop and livestock 
prices was from 1945 to 1950. A partial crop failure in 1947—corn 
yields declining from an average of 56.7 bushels in 1946 to 30.5 bushels 
in 1947, with less than a corresponding decrease in price—could account 
for the landlord’s low share in 1947- Livestock product prices increased 
proportionately more than grain prices which would result in the tenant 
receiving a larger share of net returns if he marketed the crop of the 
previous year through livestock and if the landlord sold his part of the 
current crop.
33From 1929 to 1930 the landlord’s share increased 174 percent for 
the cash lease, 40 percent for the crop-share lease and 26 percent for 
the livestock-share lease.
and production variability. This feature was dem­
onstrated in 1931 when 9 of the 10 farms sampled 
indicated a net loss, and 8 of the 10 landlords had 
net losses. The landlord’s share of the total net 
loss was 41 percent. The situation was similar 
in 1932 when 8 of the 10 farms indicated losses. 
All of the 10 landlords in the 1932 sample had 
losses; their share of the losses was 59 percent. 
This is in sharp contrast with the cash and crop- 
share landlords in the sample; all of the cash 
landlords and 8 of a sample of 10 crop-share land­
lords had net gains in 1932.
The trend in the division of net returns con­
tinued upward from 1933 to 1952. The general 
trend in prices also was upward with production 
costs following somewhat more slowly. If all re­
turns were divided evenly, the increase in the 
landlord’s share of the net return could be due 
to an unequal sharing of total expenses in the 
period of rising prices. With the landlord bearing 
the larger part of the expenses, an increase in the 
net return would have a greater relative effect 
upon his net return than on the tenant’s net in­
come. The increase could also be caused by the 
failure of costs borne by the landlord to advance 
as rapidly as those borne by the tenant, or a com­
bination of both of these causes.
With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, 
price expectations of farmers may have changed 
substantially, and one of the principal advantages 
of the livestock-share lease for the tenants was 
no longer applicable.
FRAMEWORK FOR AND KINDS OF 
RENT ADJUSTMENTS
This section is devoted to the second objective 
of the study—a diagnosis of problems of rent ad­
justment in an effort to find success elements of 
adjustments as the basis for remedial provisions 
in farm leases. The initial part of this diagnosis 
is the development of a framework for analyzing 
rent adjustments. Within this framework, the 
kinds of rent adjustments attempted by landlords 
and tenants included in the study are summarized. 
Both the framework presented and the kinds of 
rent adjustments are basic in the analysis of spe­
cific methods for adjusting rents presented in the 
following section.
A  F r a m e w o r k  f o r  M a k i n g  R e n t  A j u s t m e n t s
THE RENT NORM CONCEPT
The expected ratio of the division of the net 
return between landlord and tenant is termed the 
rent norm, and the division of net return for the 
first year is accepted as its approximation. This 
norm is used as a basis for determining variations 
in the net return ratio that landlords and ten­
ants would be willing to tolerate before making 
provisions for adjustments. Likewise, this norm 
provides the basis for putting adjustment provi­
sions into effect in an effort to maintain the norm 
within limits of permissible variations. The meth-
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od of approximating the rent norm in terms of 
expected ratio of the division of net returns 
based upon the initial period of the lease has defi­
nite limitations. First, it may not reflect the ex­
pected ratio during the initial period in which 
considerable change in prices, costs or production 
has occurred. Second, use of the division of net 
returns during the initial lease period may not 
fully take into account the possibility of major 
changes in resource contributions in the case of 
a crop-share tenant who starts with little or no 
livestock and subsequently builds up the livestock 
enterprises, or a livestock-share landlord who re­
duces his contributions by shifting away from 
livestock. Likewise, rent norm, defined as the 
landlord’s share of the division of net income, may 
increase as the landlord adds capital to the enter­
prise in the form of soil improvements, buildings 
or other productive resources.
If the norm is formulated on the basis of cur- 
ent prices, costs and average production, it will 
remain constant as long as the lease provisions 
remain unchanged. If the norm is expected to 
change, then changes in contributions are also 
anticipated. The constant rent norm concept rests 
on the projection of current price-cost" ratios 
through the term of the lease, with no change in 
technology or no change in marginal production 
of contributed resources. Consequently, resource 
productivity changes should be estimated and in­
corporated into the rent norm. Otherwise, the 
norm concept introduces inflexibilities not in keep­
ing with changing conditions, and, in this sense, 
violates the objectives it presumably helps achieve.
Rent norms vary with different kinds of rent. 
As the ratio of contributions differs under the two 
lease types, a landlord who rents for cash probably 
does not expect to receive, and his tenant does not 
expect to give, as large a share of the net returns 
as would a landlord and tenant who were oper­
ating under the crop-share plan. For the same 
reason, a landlord who rents his land under the 
crop-share plan would expect a smaller share of 
the net returns than would a landlord who uses a 
livestock-share arrangement.
This rent norm concept is similar to the base 
condition used by the landlords and tenants in 
this study in their attempts to vary rents with 
prices, costs and/or production of particular com­
modities produced on the farm covered by the 
lease. The rent norm concept also resembles the 
base wage in industries that use flexible wage pro­
visions, sometimes known as “ escalator” clauses. 
Notwithstanding its several limitations, the rent 
norm concept provides a point of departure or 
base point for working out changes in rents in 
keeping with movements of prices, costs and pro­
duction.
THE CONCEPT OF PERMISSIBLE VARIATIONS
In searching for rent adjustment provisions, 
landlords and tenants are willing to accent minor 
variations from the rent norm derived "and ad­
justed from their original agreements. The extent 
of the variations that both parties are willing to
tolerate constitute the “ permissible variation” 
concept. The mechanics of correcting for all vari­
ations would be extremely complicated. The im­
portant point is that landlord and tenant agree 
upon the range of variations they would permit 
before bringing adjustment provisions into action.
The expected variation of the division of net 
returns over time is illustrated in fig. 6. The live­
stock-share landlord’s share of the total net is 
indicated by BC, the cash landlord’s share by AD, 
and their respective rent norms are indicated. 
If OXx is a period of rising prices and cash 
rent lags behind prices, the cash landlord’s share 
of the net could be expected to decline. But if the 
cash landlord’s share were to benefit with the 
increase in prices as does the livestock-share land­
lord’s, while the cash landlord’s costs did not in­
crease in proportion to the tenant’s costs, his 
share of the net return would increase in a period 
of rising prices.
If prices are declining (period X xX 2 in fig. 6) 
and if the cash rent does not decline as rapidly 
as prices, the landlord’s net income will increase 
relative to the tenant’s net income and the net 
return ratio will increase. The situation would be 
different for the livestock-share landlord. If his 
costs did not decline as rapidly as the tenant’s 
costs while his income decreased the same as the 
tenant’s income, he would receive a smaller share 
of the net returns. This would not necessarily re­
sult, however, if the tenant’s costs were greater 
than the landlord’s c%ts.
ZONES OF TOLERANCE
Permissible variations in the net income ratios 
from the rent norm are divided into three “zones 
of tolerance” in this study. A zone of tolerance 
is defined as the limit of variation beyond which 
an adjustment provision is brought into action in 
an effort to limit the variation due to exogenous 
factors, including costs, prices and production. 




Fig. 6. Expected variation of division of net returns about the rent 
norm of a share and a cash lease.
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analyze rents and possible adjustment provisions 
are as follows : (1) the zone within which parties 
can modify the lease provisions to bring the divi­
sion back within acceptable limits, (2) the zone 
within which changes in the lease type must take 
place to restore the net return ratio to an ac­
ceptable value and (3) the zone within which they 
must seek new rental partners to receive a satis­
factory share of the farm net income.
As the net return ratio moves away from the 
rent norm, dissatisfaction with the lease provi­
sions develops, and the farther the deviation from 
the norm, the stronger the dissatisfaction. If the 
deviations are sufficiently large so that another 
lease type would be more favorable to one of the 
parties, pressure will exist against both the lease 
type and the lease provisions. Further, if neither 
the lease type nor the lease provisions are changed 
and the net return ratio deviates widely from the 
norm, the dissatisfied party may attempt to im­
prove his position by seeking a new rental part­
ner. These three critical points are shown in fig. 
7. In the diagram, ON is the rent norm. AAX is 
the range through which the division of net re­
turns would be permitted to vary with no change 
in the lease provisions. BBi is the range of per­
missible variation of the net return ratio with no 
change in lease type. Should the net return ratio 
deviate from the norm to this extent, a workable 
situation can be restored by changing the lease 
provisions. In the event that the lease provisions 
are not sufficiently flexible to provide a satisfac­
tory adjustment, additional latitude is available 
through changing lease types—as is shown in the 
range CCi in fig. 7. Deviation of the net return 
ratio beyond either C or Ci leaves the dissatisfied 
party with no alternative but to change rental 
partners; that is, if he is a tenant, he must seek 
another farm, or, if a landlord, a new tenant.
Each limit of permissible variation is the re­
sult of several factors that affect the individual. 
The amount of variation in division of income
NET RETURN ZONES OF TOLERANCE
RATIO
Fig. 7. Types of farm rent adjustments within various zones of 
tolerance.
that the party to a lease will tolerate may be 
modified by his ideas as to what is customary, by 
his alternatives to the present situation, by his 
chances of achieving these alternatives and by 
his bargaining position.34 Acceptance of a divi­
sion which varies widely from the expected di­
vision may hinge upon the physical mobility of 
the party’s resources or the social mobility of his 
family. A tenant with strong community ties 
would be willing to accept an unfavorable income 
division if his achievable alternative lay outside 
the community; landlords, living in the same com­
munity with the tenant, have not always utilized 
their bargaining position to the fullest advantage 
because of a fear of incurring social displeasure.
The premium placed upon risk aversion is re­
flected in the width of the zone of tolerance. A 
landlord with relatively fixed financial commit­
ments may be willing to accept wide variability 
in the net return ratio in exchange for stability 
of income in absolute terms. A tenant in a favor­
able risk-taking position may be willing to accept 
variability in income in exchange for a larger net 
income over time. Thus, both landlord and ten­
ant, in the above circumstances, would have wide 
zones of tolerance as a result of their willingness 
to take risks.
The parties to the lease may consider the pro­
ductivity of their resources without observing 
the return on the other resources used in com­
bination—in which case the limit of tolerance 
would have little or no meaning. The limit of 
tolerance can be expected to vary widely among 
individuals; it is not subject to a precise determi­
nation for all parties concerned with leasing.
K i n d s  o f  A d j u s t m e n t  F o u n d  i n  I n t e r v i e w s
As just discussed, landlords and tenants ap­
pear to tolerate certain ranges of variation in 
the ratio of farm rent to net farm income. When 
the variations exceed these permissible variations, 
however, one or both of the parties initiate action 
to make adjustments. The nature of the adjust­
ments depends upon the extent of the variation.
CHANGES IN  LEASE PROVISIONS
This study included certain leases in force 
for all or part of the 1989-50 period and totaling 
608 years of leasing. Cash leases studied totaled 
209 years; crop-share leases, 199 years; livestock- 
share leases, 200 years.
Cash lease. Adjustments in cash lease provi­
sions were few relative to the total number of 
possible adjustments. In the 209 years of cash 
leasing investigated, only 49 changes were dis­
closed. Of these 49 changes, 48 were changes in 
the amount of cash rent. The other change in­
volved changing the date of notification for the
34A study in north-central Iowa indicated that landlords and tenants 
considered five factors in determining a “ fair”  rent: “ what is custom­
ary,”  contributions of the parties, productivity of contributions, bar­
gaining position of each party and what is satisfactory to hoth, These 
factors have been discussed by John F. Timmons, I. W. Arthur and 
Walter E. Chryst, What rent for your farm? Iowa Farm Science, 
5:147-149.
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termination of the relationship. It would be in­
ferred from this that landlords and tenants rent­
ing for cash adjust their rental provisions once 
each 4 years on the average.
The number of changes appear to depend partly 
on the length of time the lease has been in effect. 
The relationship is not a close one, but of the 19 
tenants who were on the cash lease for more than 
5 years, 14 had made changes; of the 16 on the 
cash-type lease less than 5 years, only 3 had made 
changes. A leasing arrangement existing for 5 
years or more may be expected to have some of 
the elements of success. To determine these ele­
ments, cash leases of 5 years’ duration or longer 
were treated separately.
Tenants on the cash lease for 5 or more years 
made 38 changes in their lease provisions, a 
change about each 3 years. Increasing or de­
creasing the cash rent were the only changes made 
by these tenants. Tenants related to their land­
lords made 7 changes in a total of 35 years’ cash 
leasing, or a change each 5 years.
Changing prices, costs and production were 
responsible, either in full or in part, for all 
changes in cash rent. According to the tenants, 
changing prices were responsible for half of the 
38 changes. A combination of changing prices 
and costs were responsible for an additional 10 
(or 26 percent) of the changes. Changing prices, 
costs and production accounted for another 11 
percent of the total. Thus, changing prices entered 
into 86 percent of the changes made in cash rent. 
Only 5 percent of the changes were attributed to 
increase in the landlord’s costs.
Landlords interviewed indicated more interest 
in costs as a rent determinant than did tenants. 
Five landlords were interviewed who had made 
19 adjustments in cash rent. The landlords at­
tributed 16 (or 84 percent) of the changes to 
rising prices and costs and 3 (or 16 percent) to 
changing prices, costs and production. The cor­
responding tenants had attributed 16 (or 84 per­
cent) of the rent increases to rising prices alone 
and 3, to increasing prices, costs and production. 
The 3 adjustments caused by prices, costs and 
production were the result of a flexible lease based 
upon these factors.
Few cash tenants considered any alternatives 
to changing the cash rent. No alternatives were 
considered for 29 (or 76 percent) of the 38 
changes made.
Either an increase in the cash rent or a change 
to a share arrangement would have resulted in an 
increase in the landlord’s share of the net re­
turns. Consequently, eight of the nine alternatives 
considered involved changes to a form of the share 
lease and were suggested by the landlord. None 
of the alternatives were acceptable to the tenants 
as they felt that the share rent would result in 
the landlord receiving too large a share of the 
net return. The increase in cash rent was ac­
ceptable as a compromise between the division 
occurring with the prevailing cash rent and the 
division that would occur under a share arrange­
ment.
Of the 38 changes, 34 (or 89 percent) provided 
a satisfactory solution for the short run.35 The 
lag in cash rent with respect to prices (fig. 5) was 
the reason given for the satisfaction with 74 per­
cent of the changes in cash rent.36 A satisfactory 
division of the net returns or a level of rent lower 
than share rent accounted for the satisfaction of 
tenants with 20 percent of the changes.
Only four of the changes were unsatisfactory. 
These changes were based upon personal costs of 
a related landlord. They were not associated with 
farm production, farm price level or farm costs.
The 38 changes were made by 14 tenants. Ten­
ants making 22 (or 57 percent) of the 38 changes 
believed that they would have been evicted if they 
had refused to accept the higher rent. Tenants 
were not sure whether or not refusal to grant rent 
increases in another 32 percent of the changes 
would have necessitated their moving. In terms 
of numbers of tenants, 10 of the 14 (or 62 per­
cent) granting increases in the cash rent felt 
that the increase was necessary for the continu­
ation of the rental arrangement. Three tenants 
(or 22 percent) were not sure that they could 
have stayed without increasing the rent.
The six landlords interviewed were not as well 
satisfied with the rent adjustments as their ten­
ants. Of the 19 changes, 5 were satisfactory, and 
14 were moderately satisfactory, with the land­
lords feeling that rent never advanced as rapidly 
as prices—the same reason the tenants gave for 
their satisfaction.
Crop-share lease. Of the 65 tenants interviewed, 
31 had more than 1 year’s experience renting 
under a crop-share agreement. The total leasing 
experience of these tenants amounted to 199 
years. A total of 31 changes in lease provisions 
were made by these tenants. Of these 31 changes, 
11 were caused by changes in prices, costs or 
production, and 22 resulted from other causes.37
The 11 changes were made by 7 tenants, and 8 
of these involved increasing the cash rent. One 
tenant was permitted by his landlord to substi­
tute home improvements in lieu of increased cash 
rent.
35The concept of satisfaction as used here pertains to the existence 
of a workable situation. It is assumed that dissatisfaction cannot arise 
without the presence of an achievable alternative. The alternatives may 
develop from within or without the present situation. Thus, a tenant 
may be satisfied if he cannot improve his position with respect to the 
division of net returns or by altering his lease provisions by changing 
lease types. If, however, the tenant’s lease is sufficiently flexible, he 
may use the flexibility to offset alternatives arising within his lease 
type, e.g., comparable farm renting for less than his farm, or alterna­
tives outside of his lease type, such as another form of lease providing 
a. l?rfíer share of the net return to the tenant. Flexibility in lease pro­
visions then can restore a workable situation which permits the opera­
tion to continue and provide a satisfactory solution to problems of 
income division.
360ne tenant making eight changes in the cash rent in 12 years was 
not completely satisfied. He had experienced renting for cash in de­
pression years and wanted to base his rent on prices during favorable 
years in order_ to have an argument for reducing rent when prices were 
declining- This tenant had developed a lease in which the amount of 
rent would be determined by the price of whole milk, but was unable 
to get it into effect as the landlord regarded such a lease as unduly 
complicated.
37The changes in lease provisions not resulting from changes in 
prices, costs or production were such changes as the tenant managing 
the disposal of the crop because of the landlord’s enfeeblement, renting 
soybean ground for cash because of lack of storage for hay on rented 
tract, taking over maintenance of improvements because tenant expected 
to inherit property and corrections of mistakes in lease.
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Only two adjustments in share proportions 
were found. One respondent made two changes 
in his lease at different times because of changes 
in production. In 1942 and in 1944 the corn crop 
was a near failure, and, on one occasion, the land­
lord sold his interest in the crop to the tenant 
for less than $1 per acre. In the other year, the 
landlord gave the tenant the entire crop. This 
permitted the tenant to utilize the corn as ensilage 
and resulted in a larger income than would have 
been forthcoming had the corn been handled in 
the usual way.
As would be expected in a period of rising 
prices, the changes were usually made at the 
landlord’s suggestion. All of the increases in cash 
rent and the home improvements in lieu of an 
increase in rent were suggested by the landlord. 
The decision to give all the poor crop to the ten­
ant was arrived at jointly.
No alternatives were considered for any of the 
changes and all were satisfactory to the respond­
ents. The usual reason given for the satisfaction 
with the change was that prices advanced more 
than the rent advanced, or, even with the advance, 
the cash-rented land was cheap compared with 
their share-rented land. All tenants felt that the 
landlords were satisfied with the size of the in­
crease. Three tenants believed that if the in­
crease had not been granted they would have 
been evicted, and the other four said that the in­
crease was not absolutely necessary in order for 
them to stay on the farm. Of these four, three 
were renting from relatives.
Livestock-share lease. Thirty-three tenants were 
interviewed who had had a total of 199 years of 
experience with the livestock-share lease from 
1939 to 1950. Ten of these tenants made 14 
changes in lease provisions to adjust for changes 
in prices, costs or production. Four tenants made 
changes for other causes.
Twelve of the 14 changes were made to com­
pensate tenants for their increased costs. The cost 
increases for which the tenants wanted  ^compen­
sation were changes in fuel prices, machinery and 
repair costs, and wages.
Four of the changes involved transfer of the 
poultry and dairy enterprise to the tenant. The 
procedure in all of these cases was for the tenant 
to buy the landlord’s interest in these enterprises 
and to use grain from an undivided supply. The 
tenant bought protein supplement feed. The num­
ber of cows or chickens permitted outside of the 
lease arrangement was limited by the landlord. 
All of these changes were made at the tenant’s 
suggestion. Transfer of the dairy cows to the 
tenant was successful in maintaining the rental 
relationship, but tenants assuming the poultry 
enterprise regarded the adjustment as inadequate 
and later moved to other farms.
In another case, the landlord took half of the 
poultry enterprise when prices increased in 1942. 
As poultry was only a small part of the output, 
the tenant did not resist the change but later 
changed landlords to get a more satisfactory lease.
Another adjustment in the division of returns 
on one farm was to alter the shares from dairying. 
Dairying was the principal source of income from 
the farming operation. Following a rise in the 
tenant labor cost, the tenant’s share of the milk 
proceeds was increased from 50 percent to 67 per­
cent. Later, after the landlord has built a new 
barn, the original division was restored. The land­
lord and tenant were related in this case.
One tenant discontinued paying the landlord 
half of the value of products used in home con­
sumption as a partial adjustment for increased 
operational costs. The change was not adequate 
to offset the tenant’s higher costs, but it helped 
hold the relationship together.
Three tenants approached the problem of ad­
justing for increased costs more directly by 
obtaining the landlord’s participation in the con­
tributions that had risen most in cost—machinery, 
fuel and labor. One landlord found that the only 
incentive that would cause the tenant to operate 
a beef enterprise on the scale that the landlord 
wanted was to pay part of the cost of the addi­
tional hired labor. This payment has been effec­
tive, and both landlord and tenant expressed their 
satisfaction with the arrangement. Another ten­
ant had been paying rent on the hired man’s 
house and this practice was discontinued when 
wages increased. But the tenant did not feel that 
this was an adequate adjustment. In addition to 
the concession on wages, the landlord (the ten­
ant’s father) started paying a fixed sum of $600 
per year to offset increased costs of machinery and 
fuel. While the tenant did not feel that these 
amounts were adequate, the payments were re­
sponsible for the continued operation of the lease. 
The third tenant received $50 per year for the 
part-time services of a grown son but did not 
feel that this was sufficient and moved to a larger 
farm where the son’s labor would be utilized more 
effectively.
Alternatives were considered for only 3 of the 
14 changes. The alternatives considered by one 
tenant were all of the dairy and all of the poultry, 
or all of the dairy and half of the poultry. The 
second alternative was rejected because the tenant 
felt that the landlord’s share of the net returns 
was already too high.
The other two alternatives were considered in 
lieu of the tenants taking over the poultry enter­
prise. One tenant wanted the landlord to pay 
half the cost of the tractor fuel, the change that 
gave rise to the dissatisfaction. The landlord 
would not make this concession. The tenant did 
not feel that the adjustment was adequate and 
eventually secured a change in lease type. The 
other tenant who considered an alternative to 
taking over the poultry wanted the landlord to 
pay a larger part of the costs of grass seed. The 
landlord refused to do so, but later assumed the 
cost. Both changes together did not provide a 
satisfactory solution, and the tenant later moved 
to a smaller farm that he owned
Further adjustments were desired after six of 
the changes were made. Giving the tenant the
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poultry enterprise was insufficient adjustment in 
both cases and three of the four landlords’ con­
tributions to machinery, fuel and labor expenses 
were regarded as inadequate.
At the time the changes were made, the tenants 
regarded only one as necessary to keep the rental 
relation intact. Subsequently, however, 4 of the 
10 tenants moved or changed lease types because 
they were unable to make adjustments in the 
livestock-share contracts.
Landlords of eight tenants were interviewed. 
Provisions of five of the eight leases had been 
changed. One of the changes involved changing 
the lease term. The tenant changed from a 3-year 
to a 1-year lease to be in a position to change 
lease types, or farms if necessary, if prices and 
costs changed in such a way that he would be bet­
ter off with another type of lease. This tenant 
had previously changed to a livestock-share type 
lease in 1946 because of an expected decline in 
prices with a smaller decrease in costs. He had 
secured a 3-year livestock-share lease as protec­
tion against that contingency. As prices and costs 
increased contrary to his 1946 expectations, the 
longer term lease proved to be to his disadvantage. 
The other five changes are discussed above. All 
changes were satisfactory to the landlords and 
none desired further modification of the lease 
term at the time of interview.
At the time the changes were made, none was 
regarded by either landlords or tenants as neces­
sary for the continued operation of the lease; but 
of the five tenants making changes, two later 
moved or changed lease types because of dissatis­
faction with the division of net returns under the 
livestock-share arrangement. Of the three who 
made no change in the lease provisions, two later 
discontinued the relationship and moved because 
of an unsatisfactory division of the net return.
CHANGES IN  LEASE TYPES
Large shifts from one form of tenancy to an­
other occurred in Iowa from 1945 to 1950. Accord­
ing to the United States Census of 1950, the 
number of cash tenants declined nearly 40 per­
cent during the period, while the number of share- 
cash tenants increased 50.9 percent. The number
of tenants classified as share and cropper, which 
would include livestock-share tenants, decreased 
34.3 percent, and the number of unclassified ten­
ants decreased by 23.7 percent. The 50.91 percent 
increase in share-cash tenants is even more sig­
nificant when considered along with a 12.1-percent 
decrease in total tenancy of all forms.
Various lease types offer landlords and tenants 
a set of alternatives for adjusting the division 
of net returns. Approximately 400 tenants co­
operated with the Iowa Farm Business Associ­
ations from 1940 to 1950 and these tenants made 
a total of 148 changes in lease type during the 10 
years (table 4). The period was one in which the 
cash-rent type of lease was most favorable to ten­
ants from the standpoint of division of net returns 
and the livestock-share lease the least favorable. 
Throughout the period, there was a net gain of 
21 cash leases and 14 crop-share leases, and a net 
loss of 35 livestock-share leases. This would in­
dicate that tenants held an advantage in bargain­
ing power during the period. The situation is 
somewhat different, however, when the time cov­
ered is divided into the war and postwar periods.
The war period, 1940 through 1946, was one 
of decreased supply of farm manpower, and ten­
ants were in a favorable bargaining position. Of 
80 changes made in lease type, there was a net 
gain of 19 to the cash lease, a net loss of 1 to 
the crop-share lease, and a net loss of 18 to the 
livestock-share arrangement (table 4). Tenants 
were able, in large part, to select leases that gave 
them the most favorable divisions of the net re­
turns.
In the postwar period the bargaining position 
of tenants has been reversed. With the return of 
veterans, many of whom were seeking rental 
farms, competition for farms has been stronger 
and tenants have had less choice as to type of 
lease. Of the 68 changes occuring in lease type 
between 1947 and 1950, there was a net gain of 2 
to the cash lease, 15 to the crop-share lease and a 
net loss of 17 to the livestock-share plan. As the 
net return ratios of the cash and livestock-share 
leases show considerable divergence in this period, 
the shift to the crop-share arrangement may con­
stitute a compromise between the two lease types.
The data presented in table 4 have been found
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to be subject to some error through inaccuracies 
of observation and classification. The shifts in 
lease types made by business association cooper­
ators in the postwar period, however, are similar 
to those indicated by the United States Census 
data summarized in table 2.
Only three tenants could be found who had 
changed from a cash lease to another form and 
also had retained the same farm and landlord. 
These three tenants changed to a crop-share ar­
rangement ; none were found who had changed to 
the livestock-share plan. The changes were made 
in 1947, 1948 and 1949. All changes were made at 
the landlord’s suggestion. The changes, according 
to the tenants, were caused by increased farm 
prices and ownership costs. As two of the land­
lords did not offer alternatives in the form of high­
er cash rent, apparently they felt that cash rent 
could not be increased enough in the environment 
of custom to provide an adequate adjustment. Two 
tenants were willing to pay a larger cash rent, but 
not the cash equivalent of the share rent. The 
third party, who was offered an alternative in the 
form of a substantial increase in cash rent, de­
clined the alternative for the same reason, even 
though the cash rent, including the increase, would 
have amounted to less than the share rent.38
Two of the three tenants were reluctant to make 
the change to share rent as they expected to re­
ceive a smaller share of the net returns under the 
new arrangement. One was not opposed to the 
change since his principal income was from live­
stock and not from the crops grown on the farm.
While the change resulted in higher rent, two 
tenants regarded it as successful because it pro­
vided a division of the returns acceptable to both 
parties and permitted continuation of the rental 
relationship.
Two of the three tenants felt that they would 
have been required to move had they not accepted 
the changes. In all cases, acceptance of the changes 
in lease types was acknowledgment of the superior 
bargaining position of the landlords.
A total of 10 tenants were interviewed who had 
changed from the crop-share lease to another type 
of lease while retaining the same farm and land­
lord. Of these 10, 8 had changed to cash leases 
and 2 to the livestock-share. Of the 10, half had 
changed their lease type in order to adjust for 
changes in prices, costs or production. Three ten­
ants changed from a crop-share to a cash lease 
and two tenants from a crop-share to a livestock- 
share lease.
None of the tenants who changed lease types 
as a result of direct economic causes was related 
to his landlord. All tenants making the change 
for other reasons were related to their land­
lords.39
380ne tenant, who was not satisfied with the change at the time it 
was made, moved after 1 year on the crop-share plan. The increase 
in the landlord’s share of the returns was responsible for his moving.
39Three of the five changes made for reasons other than adjusting 
for prices, costs and production were made because of the landlord’s 
inability to further participate in management. The remaining changes 
were made to simplify record keeping. All the changes from the crop- 
share lease arising from noneconomic causes were designed to transfer 
part of the managerial duties of the landlord to the tenant.
Of the 3 changing from a crop-share to a cash 
lease to compensate for economic changes, 2 made 
the change in 1941 and 1 in 1945. Both of those 
changing in 1941 said that the change was made 
because cash rent was lower than share rent, and 
both suggested that the change be made. The 
tenant who changed from a crop-share lease to 
a cash lease in 1945 did so at the landlord’s in­
sistence and had to accept a 3-year cash lease.40 
It was the tenant’s opinion that the landlord ex­
pected a decline in farm prices following World 
War II and wanted a cash lease as protection 
against a decline in income. This view was sub­
stantiated in part when the landlord insisted on 
changing back to the crop-share lease after the 
expiration of the 3-year period when prices had 
risen rather than declined. The tenant felt that 
his bargaining position was weak relative to the 
landlord’s and he was left with no alternative 
but to comply with the landlord’s wishes.
None of the tenants changing from a crop-share 
lease type for economic reasons considered any 
alternatives.
Two tenants changed from a crop-share to a 
livestock-share lease; one made the change in 1940 
and the other in 1947. Both changes were made 
because of the landlord’s dissatisfaction with his 
share of the net returns under the crop-share ar­
rangement. The tenant making the change in 
1940 felt that his capital was limited and that 
his return would be greater under the livestock- 
share plan. No alternatives were considered by 
the tenant making the change in 1947, as he felt 
that number of farms available for renting were 
too few relative to the number of tenants for 
him to bargain effectively.
Tenants making the change from crop-share 
leases to cash leases were well satisfied with the 
change. The reason given in all cases was the 
failure of the cash rent to advance as rapidly as 
prices.41 Two felt that their landlords were satis­
fied with the change when it was made and also 
after a period of time had elapsed. The third 
tenant felt that his landlord was satisfied origin­
ally, but after a rise in prices the landlord in­
sisted on changing back to the crop-share plan.42
Neither of the changes to livestock-share rent­
ing worked out successfully. One tenant became 
dissatisfied with his share of the net return and 
was able to buy a farm from the landlord. The 
other tenant making the change from crop-share 
to livestock-share has been dissatisfied with the di­
vision since the change was made and is seeking 
adjustments in the lease.
A total of nine tenants who had changed from 
the livestock-share lease were interviewed. Of 
these nine, seven had changed from the livestock- 
share plan to the cash lease, and two had changed 
from the livestock-share plan to the crop-share
40The tenant had rented the farm for more than 20 years previously 
on a year-to-year basis.
41Of the three making the change, two later bought the farms they 
were renting.
420nly one landlord involved in any of the changes from crop-share 
leases was interviewed. This landlord was a banker who managed a 
large number of farms at the time the change was made and did not 
recall many of the details surrounding the change.
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arrangement. All of the former group of tenants, 
and one of the latter group, are related to their 
landlord.
Six of seven changes from livestock-share to 
cash resulted from changes in prices, costs and 
production and occurred after 1945. Of the two 
changing from livestock-share to crop-share, one 
made the change in 1941 and the other in 1949. 
The tenant making the change in 1941 was not 
related to the landlord and possibly would have 
encountered more resistance to the change if the 
attempt had been made in the postwar period.
Of the eight changes resulting from changes 
in prices, costs and production, seven were made 
at the suggestion of the tenant. This would sug­
gest that both landlords and tenants had knowl­
edge of which lease was most favorable with 
respect to their incomes. None of the changes 
were suggested by landlords; the one change not 
suggested by the tenant was a result of a court 
order in the administration of an estate. The 
court contended that the livestock-share plan en­
tailed too much risk for the estate. The court de­
cision was satisfactory to the tenant who had 
previously failed to obtain a change of lease type 
or modification of his livestock-share lease pro­
visions.
Two alternatives were considered by those 
changing to the cash lease. One tenant said that 
he would have discontinued farming and sought 
employment as a farm laborer had he been unable 
to change from the livestock-share plan. Another 
tenant offered to buy the farm from the landlord, 
and after 6 years’ operation on the cash lease 
plan the landlord sold the farm to the tenant.
All tenants changing from the livestock-share 
lease expressed satisfaction with the change. Of 
the eight making the change, seven regarded the 
change successful and one moderately success­
ful. The tenant with reservations with respect to 
the success of the change in lease type found live­
stock improvements difficult to obtain after chang­
ing from a livestock-share to a crop-share lease.
The success of the changes was due to the effect 
upon the division of net income. Six of the re­
spondents who said the change was successful 
attributed their satisfaction to their larger share 
of the net income, and one to the fact that prices 
subsequently increased more than his cash rent.
Seven of the eight tenants changing from live­
stock-share leases believed that their landlords 
were satisfied with the change but some expressed 
reservations or indicated that landlords were not 
as well satisfied as they were before the change 
was made. One tenant, who was related to his 
landlord, said that the change was not satis­
factory to the landlord at any time following the 
change. This tenant has since bought the farm.
Although all but one of the tenants making 
the change were related to their landlords, half, 
or four, of them said they would not have con­
tinued to rent on the livestock-share lease.43 In
43The landlord’s views were not obtained. As all but one of these 
respondents were related to tlie landlord, it was necessary to interview 
several tenants in the landlord’s presence. Every effort was made to 
prevent these interviews from causing difficulty between landlord and
addition to these, one more was uncertain as to 
whether he would have continued with the live­
stock-share arrangement. The change from the 
livestock-share lease appears to have been a neces­
sary adjustment in the division of net returns for 
the preservation of the rental relationship.
CHANGES IN FARMS
A total of 19 tenants who had changed farms 
or discontinued farming were interviewed. Of 
these 19 tenants, 15 made the change because of 
dissatisfaction with the lease. The four making 
the change for reasons other than dissatisfaction 
with the lease changed because of dissatisfaction 
with the farm, uncertainty of tenure, inability 
to agree with the landlord and death of the land­
lord.
All but one of the tenants changing farms be­
cause of dissatisfaction with the lease changed 
lease types at the same time. In addition to these 
tenants, one former tenant was interviewed who 
had quit farming and assumed another occupa­
tion as a result of his inability to get a satis­
factory lease. Of the 13 tenants interviewed who 
changed lease types and farms simultaneously, 
two changed from the cash lease, three from the 
crop-share type, and eight from the livestock- 
share lease.
Both of the tenants interviewed who changed 
farms and changed from the cash type lease did 
so because of demands from the landlords for 
more cash rent. The two tenants felt that, in the 
light of price uncertainty, the landlord’s desired 
cash rent involved too much risk. One tenant 
made the change in 1947, and the other in 1948— 
years in which prices fluctuated considerably.
One tenant offered his landlord the alternative 
of some increase in cash rent, although a smaller 
increase than the landlord desired, or changing 
to the crop-share arrangement. Neither of the 
alternatives was acceptable to the landlord and 
the tenant moved after finding a farm available 
on crop-share terms. Risk aversion was an im­
portant factor in the tenant’s resistance to in­
creased cash rent.
The other tenant who changed from the cash 
plan changed to the livestock-share, and made no 
counter offers to the landlord. The tenant felt 
that the cash rent was already too much at the 
time the landlord made the additional demand, 
and as he had an opportunity to rent a larger 
farm on the livestock-share plan, with the land­
lord bearing more than the customary expenses, 
he refused to grant the increase.
Both tenants felt that the change improved 
their long-run position with respect to division 
of net income, and regarded the change as success­
ful. Neither believed that any problems with his 
present landlord were incapable of solution or 
that he would have to change farms again in order 
to adjust the division of net returns.
tenant, and when the landlord was present he was not asked to confirm 
or deny the information given by the tenant. Of the landlords not pres­
ent at the time of interview, all were economically inaccessible or in a 
state of health that prevented their being interviewed.
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Three tenants were interviewed who changed 
farms and changed from the crop-share type of 
lease at the same time. Two changed to the live- 
stock-share, and one to the cash lease arrange­
ment.
The changes from the crop-share leases were 
unsatisfactory to tenants who made the change. 
The tenant who changed farms and changed from 
the crop-share to the cash lease made the change 
in 1950 and did so because of inability to agree 
with the landlord about rental terms. The land­
lord wanted to change to cash rent or to change 
the landlord’s share from 40 to 50 percent. The 
tenant offered to change to cash rent at a rate 
lower than the rate the landlord asked. Agree­
ment on the terms could not be obtained and the 
tenant moved to a less productive farm renting 
for less than the proposed rent of the original 
farm. The tenant now feels that the rent is ex­
tremely high relative to the productivity of the 
farm and that he would have been in a better 
position if he had paid the rent the first landlord 
asked. The move did not provide a satisfactory 
solution to the tenant’s problems and unless the 
rent is reduced on the second farm he indicated 
that he will move again.
The two tenants who changed farms and chang­
ed from crop-share to livestock-share leases did 
so because of an expected decline in farm prices. 
One made the change in 1941 and the other in 
1946. Both expected the livestock-share lease to 
provide a larger share of the net returns to the 
tenant on a decline of price level. But prices did 
not decline, and both tenants believed that they 
would have fared better by continuing on the 
old arrangement.44 Neither of the crop-share 
landlords offered any alternative to the tenant 
when he desired to make the change in lease types.
Two of the three landlords owning the farms 
from which the moves were made were inter­
viewed; Each landlord confirmed his tenant’s ver­
sion of the difficulties leading to the move. The 
landlords had no trouble in obtaining new tenants 
willing to rent on the terms the former tenants 
had rejected.
Eight tenants were interviewed who had 
changed from livestock-share leases at the time 
they changed farms; three tenants changed from 
livestock-share to cash, and five changed from 
livestock-share to crop-share leases.
The eight changes were distributed fairly uni­
formly over the period studied with only two of 
the changes occurring in the same year.
All of the changes were made for a single 
reason; livestock-share rent was considered high 
relative to rent under the other lease types. Half 
of the tenants would have continued on the live­
stock-share plan and remained on the farm if 
some adjustments had been made in the poultry
440ne tenant succeeded in getting a livestock-share lease that differed 
somewhat from the customary lease—the landlord pays three-fifths of 
i u e^r^ zer costs and receives half of the crop, pays part of the hired 
labor costs and bears other expenses normally paid by the tenant— 
and the division of net returns under the livestock-share plan is not 
considered unsatisfactory. The other tenant making the change event­
ually became dissatisfied with the division of the net return and moved 
to a smaller farm that he had previously purchased.
and dairy enterprise. Three other tenants would 
have remained on the farm if they could have 
changed to another lease type. Thus, in seven of 
the eight cases, the costs associated with moving 
could have been avoided by modifying the rental 
arrangement—and, in half of the cases, the modi­
fication needed was very small.
None of the landlords involved offered the ten­
ants any alternative to acceptance of the live­
stock-share lease unchanged. One landlord, after 
the tenant had moved, offered the adjustments 
the tenant wanted originally if he would move 
back. The tenant had changed to a cash-rented 
farm and would not have rented again on the live­
stock-share lease without additional modifications.
All tenants changing farms and changing from 
the livestock-share lease considered the changes 
as a satisfactory solution to their rental problems 
of income and income division. Four of the ten­
ants later acquired ownership stating that land 
prices and ownership costs had not increased as 
rapidly as rent. None of the tenants believed that 
their new rental arrangements contained any 
problems pertaining to the mechanism of the lease 
that could not have been worked out with the new 
landlord. Not all tenants making subsequent 
changes did so because of inability to agree with 
the landlord on rental terms.
Only one tenant was interviewed who had 
changed farms and retained the same lease type. 
The change was made because of the tenant’s dis­
satisfaction with the division of net returns un­
der a livestock-share arrangement and his inabil­
ity to obtain modifications of the leasing arrange­
ment. The tenant wanted to have all of the re­
turns from the poultry and dairy enterprises to 
compensate for his increased costs. The landlord 
would not agree to these changes and the tenant 
rented another farm under a livestock-share lease 
which permitted him to retain all dairy and poul­
try receipts. This change provided a satisfactory 
division of the net return for a number of years. 
The tenant eventually became an owner but not 
because of any dissatisfaction with the lease. The 
owner of the farm from which the tenant moved 
verified the tenant’s account of the cause of the 
change. The farm was rented to another tenant 
on the same terms that the original tenant had 
refused to accept.
One tenant was interviewed who had given up 
farming as an occupation. The tenant had oper­
ated a small farm on the livestock-share arrange­
ment. He became dissatisfied with the division 
of net returns and believed that the division was 
not appropriate to the ratio of the contributions. 
The landlord offered the tenant a crop-share lease 
but the tenant did not feel that this would be an 
adequate adjustment. He had an opportunity to 
enter another line of employment and this has 
provided a satisfactory solution to his income 
problems.
A total of 20 tenants were interviewed who 
had changed from a form of tenancy to full own­
ership. Of these 20, 11 became owners because 
of direct dissatisfaction with their rental arrange-
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ments. The rest acquired ownership for such 
miscellaneous reasons as desire for security of 
tenure, freedom from landlord’s interference in 
the management of the farm and inheritance.
Of the 11 tenants changing to ownership, only 
two attempted to negotiate with the landlords 
before leaving the farm. One tenant, renting on 
crop-share, would not have terminated the rental 
relationship if the lease type had been changed 
to cash. He had rented the farm for a number 
of years on a cash arrangement and changed to 
the crop-share plan at the landlord’s insistence. 
Following 1 year on the crop-share plan he moved 
to a farm he had previously purchased.
The other tenant who negotiated with his land­
lord before buying a farm had operated several 
years on a livestock-share arrangement. During 
this period his operating expenses, particularly 
those for machinery replacements, repairs, fuel 
and labor, increased considerably. The landlord 
offered to pay part of the hired labor cost but 
the tenant did not consider this an adequate ad­
justment.
All except one of the tenants interviewed who 
obtained ownership in the 1939-50 period were 
well satisfied with the change. The reason given 
by all of those satisfied was the rising level of 
farm prices throughout the period, which enabled 
them to reduce their debts easily and secure their 
equity in the property.45 The one tenant who did 
not find ownership a satisfactory solution to his 
rental problems bought a small farm. Operation 
of this farm did not keep him fully employed and 
he felt that he would have been in a better posi­
tion by staying on as a renter on the other farm.
Six landlords were interviewed, three of whom 
had sold their farms to the tenants. These three 
landlords sold because they needed their money 
for other purposes; the tenants bought because 
the costs of ownership were less than the rent 
they were paying. Of the remaining three land­
lords whose tenants bought farms, two confirmed 
that their tenants bought because of inability to 
agree on rental terms and one that he bought 
because of the difference between rent and owner­
ship costs. Both landlords whose tenants bought 
farms because of their inability to agree on rental 
terms succeeded in obtaining tenants who would 
accept the terms the landlord desired —  the 
changes having occurred in 1948, a year in which 
the demand for rental farms was very intense.
I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  O b s e r v e d  C h a n g e s  f o r  
R e n t a l  A d j u s t m e n t s
The preceding information obtained through 
interviews with landlords and tenants indicates 
that they have attempted numerous means for 
making adjustments in light of changing costs, 
prices and production. The rental adjustments 
attempted, although not numerous, are outlined 
in the next section as possibilities for other land-
_*®From 1939 through 1949 average cash rent increased 122 percent 
while land values increased 102 percent. Computed from B. French and 
W- Chly st- Prices affecting Iowa agriculture 1910-49 (mimeo). pp. 
34-39. Ames. 1950.
lords and tenants to consider in working out their 
rental problems.
It becomes obvious from this information that 
share arrangements provide m o r e  protection 
against variability of prices, costs and production 
than cash leases; consequently, share tenants 
made fewer changes in their arrangements than 
cash tenants. Changes in cash and crop-share 
lease provisions are restricted largely to changes 
in the amount of cash rent. Half of the changes 
in the livestock-share provisions were of ques­
tionable value and half concerned the problem 
of increased costs directly.
The difficulty in finding tenants who had 
changed lease types while retaining the same farm 
and landlord indicates that this technique is sel­
dom used. But no difficulty was encountered in 
finding tenants who had changed farms. Of the 
14 changing farms because of dissatisfaction with 
their rental arrangements, 13 changed lease types 
at the same time. Since few make changes in 
lease type while retaining the same farm and 
landlord, but nearly all change lease types with 
a change in farms, there is some reason to be­
lieve that a given lease type remains in effect on 
the farm with the new tenant. This could be 
expected since landlords have been in a favorable 
bargaining position since World War II. If the 
tenant cannot obtain changes in lease provision 
or lease type, his alternative is to find a landlord 
willing to rent under the type he desires. The 
cause of 14 of the 19-moves investigated was to 
obtain a lease type not available on the farms the 
tenants were operating.
Of the 20 tenants interviewed who acquired 
ownership, 4 were pushed into ownership because 
of inability to get a satisfactory lease, and 7 be­
came owners because of more favorable expecta­
tions of income under ownership than renting. 
The remaining 9 tenants who acquired owner­
ship did so because of inheritance, desire for se­
curity of tenure and related factors.
ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF RENT 
ADJUSTMENT
This section is devoted to the third objective of 
this study—appraising various methods, propos­
als and experiences for adjusting rents to changes 
in costs, prices and production. Specific methods 
used by landlords and tenants interviewed are 
presented and analyzed. Some additional rent- 
adjustment proposals are examined. Rent-adjust­
ment experiences in selected foreign countries are 
summarized. From these methods, proposals and 
experiences, landlords and tenants are provided 
with a wider choice of possible means for work­
ing out rent-adjustment provisions to fill their 
needs.
D e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  S u b j e c t iv e  Z o n e s  
o f  T o l e r a n c e
Interviews with farm tenants and landlords 
summarized in the previous section, indicated that
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(1) certain variations from the rent norm are 
tolerated by landlords and tenants, (2) beyond 
these permissible variations (zones of tolerance) 
landlords and tenants attempt to make adjust­
ments and (3) zones of tolerance as well as ad­
justments attempted vary with individual land­
lords and tenants. Thus it is not possible to 
determine precise margins of tolerance as bases 
for specific types of remedial adjustments for all 
tenants and landlords. In each instance, they 
should decide for themselves the variations in 
net return ratios they will tolerate before making 
adjustments.
FACTORS INFLUENCING MARGINS OF TOLERANCE
As an aid in arriving at zones of tolerance for 
a particular landlord and tenant, some of the 
more important factors affecting margins of tol­
erance are reviewed. In general, the willingness 
to accept a given variation from the rent norm 
appears to rest largely upon the nature and effec­
tiveness of alternatives available to mitigate the 
variation. These alternatives are appraised ac­
cording to: (1) the degree to which they will 
alleviate the current difficulties and (2) the costs 
involved in their acceptance.
The extent to which an individual is willing to 
rely upon custom is important in determining how 
much variation he will permit in the net return 
ratio before seeking the remedy of a change in the 
lease provision. Some landlords and tenants view 
a change in prices, costs and production as an 
aberration which will “ average out” in the long 
run, while others view such a change as indicative 
of a trend and seek remedial action immediately. 
Again, the acceptability of a particular change in 
a lease provision is not the same for everyone and 
this results in different margins of tolerance. 
Evidence of this was found in cases where the 
transfer of minor enterprises under some live- 
stock-share leases was sufficient to maintain the 
relationship while the same offer was rejected in 
other cases with the result that the tenant moved 
to another farm. Heavily encumbered landlords 
may be more dependent upon the stability of the 
farm income than debt-free landlords, hence they 
may react more quickly to a change in the eco­
nomic environment.
With respect to the margin of tolerance deter­
mining changes in lease types, individuals are 
influenced by different kinds of factors. In con­
sidering a change in lease type, tenants and land­
lords may consider such items as their capital 
position, change in type of farming required, in­
creased risk and redistribution of managerial 
responsibilities. Some share tenants, having saved 
a year’s cash rent, changed to cash rent when the 
increase in the share net return ratio was rela­
tively small; others, in a similar liquidity position, 
were unwilling to assume the risks of cash renting 
and remained on the share arrangement. Simi­
larly, landlords in a position to supply the addi­
tional management required under the share lease 
could be expected to tolerate less of a decline in 
the cash rent net return ratio before changing to
share arrangements than those landlords who 
could not supply the extra management. Land­
lords were interviewed who appreciated the 
superior nature of the livestock-share arrange­
ments but were unwilling to supply the additional 
management, either by increasing their personal 
supervision or by hire.
The amount of variation in the net return 
ratio a tenant will tolerate before changing farms 
will depend upon such items as the location of the 
alternative farm, type of housing, difficulties of 
moving and re-establishing operation, and reluc­
tance to disrupt community ties and children’s 
education. It is unlikely that any two tenants 
will attach the same importance to each of these 
factors, and to the extent that they fail to do so, 
different margins of tolerance will result. Land­
lords may weigh differently the difficulty of find­
ing another tenant and the loss of income while 
his operation is becoming adjusted to the farm, 
with the result that their margins of tolerance for 
changes in tenants will differ.
Willingness to change to ownership as an alter­
native to an unfavorable leasing situation will be 
governed by such factors as capital position, age 
of operator, number of heirs and anticipation with 
respect to future price levels. Some tenants were 
interviewed who did not hesitate to buy a farm 
as an alternative to their leasing situation. Others, 
in equally favorable capital positions and also 
dissatisfied with the division of returns, continued 
to operate as renters. The different ways in which 
operators view the hazards and needs of farm 
ownership prevent the determination of a margin 
of tolerance of any widespread applicability. A 
number of tenants were interviewed who had 
made the transition to ownership as soon as the 
net return ratio deviated from the norm. Others 
were found who were somewhat dissatisfied with 
the division of returns but were reluctant to risk 
their savings in an attempt to acquire ownership.
Similarly, the decision to leave farming as an 
occupation is determined by considerations that 
vary widely by individuals. Again, the alternative 
opportunity is applicable, particularly as viewed 
from the standpoint of occupational preferences. 
Also, the age and training of the individual may 
enter into his decision to leave or remain in farm­
ing. Similarly, before turning to other outlets 
for his capital, a landlord with an agricultural 
background may tend to tolerate a larger devi­
ation in the net ratio than one viewing the farm 
only as an investment.
The variety of factors considered and the dif­
ferential weighting by individual landlords and 
tenants makes determination of the margins of 
tolerance upon any aggregative basis meaningless 
as well as difficult. The distributions of net return 
ratios accompanying changes of particular types 
reveal large variances. It appears to be relatively 
meaningless, therefore, to design techniques that 
will keep the net return ratio within a specific 
zone of tolerance for all landlords and tenants. 
The task of determining variations in net return 
ratios from the rent norm falls upon each landlord
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and tenant. After this decision has been made, 
there are numerous methods whereby variations 
in net return ratios may be decreased. These 
methods are discussed in the following sections.
P r o v is io n s  i n  U s e  b y  L a n d l o r d s  
a n d  T e n a n t s
In trying to adjust rents to changes in costs, 
prices and production, certain landlords and ten­
ants had developed specific rent adjustment plans 
as provisions in their rental arrangements. Some 
of these provisions justify serious consideration 
for more extensive use; other provisions appear 
to have serious limitations.
BASE AND BONUS PLAN
One rent-adjustment provision was reported in 
use by a tenant who had rented for cash for more 
than 35 years and had experienced the price col­
lapses of 1921 and 1929. In 1942, realizing that 
prices were rising, that rent would follow, that 
prices would eventually turn down and that cash 
rent would lag, he offered a “bonus” to his land­
lord beyond the 1941 rental for renewing the 
lease. In subsequent years, the 1941 rental terms 
served as the base and the amount of the bonus 
for the forthcoming period was negotiated on the 
basis of prices received, costs incurred and rent 
of comparable land in the current production 
period. The advantages of this plan are twofold: 
(1) The tenant is protected against any sudden 
decline in prices as he is legally committed only 
for the base rent and (2) the landlord receives a 
rent based upon current economic conditions.
The plan requires a high degree of mutual con­
fidence. As the tenant is obligated only for the 
base rent and as the bonus for renewal is nego­
tiated after the legal date for serving notice of 
termination, the tenant could refuse to pay any 
compensating amount and thus obtain use of the 
property for 2 years at the base rent. The land­
lord is aware of this possibility but is well satis­
fied with the way the plan functions. Also, the 
plan does not provide for crop failure and hence 
does not constitute an adjustment for serious de­
clines in production. Neither does it provide for 
exceptional high production which would provide 
a basis for the tenant to pay a higher rent.
DEFERMENT OF RENT DETERMINATION PLAN
A similar arrangement was found between an­
other landlord and tenant. No rent was agreed 
upon at the time the farm was let. At the end 
of each crop year, the parties met and decided 
upon an appropriate rent in consideration of 
prices, costs and production. While this plan en­
abled the parties to take all relevant factors into 
account, the shortcomings are even more serious 
than those of the preceding plan. The tenant’s 
legal commitments for rent are extremely vague 
and a high degree of mutual confidence is required. 
The parties interviewed, however, had never en­
countered difficulty in arriving at an acceptable 
rent under this plan.
CASH-SHARE OPTION PLAN
Another arrangement was found under which a 
landlord offered his tenants the choice between 
cash rent for the entire farm or share rent for 
the cropland and cash for the hay land and pas­
ture. The tenant was required to declare his in­
tention with respect to the option by September 1 
for the current crop year. Thus, if corn prospects 
were good and the price was favorable relative 
to the agreed cash rent, the tenant could choose 
to pay cash rent for the farm. If corn prospects 
were poor and the price unfavorable, the tenant 
could choose to pay share rent under their agree­
ment. The particular tenant interviewed operated 
under this plan from 1937 to 1944, and, as prices 
were rising, he chose the cash rent each year.
Unless such a plan attracts better tenants, it 
offers few advantages to the landlord. The plan 
does permit partial adjustment for changes in 
prices and production, but, as the option rests 
solely with the tenant, the adjustment is one­
sided. In an effort to compensate partially for 
this “ onesidedness,” the date of declaration was 
advanced to July 1 and much of the utility of the 
plan was lost to the tenant.
COMMODITY PRICE ADJUSTMENT PLAN
One of the most successful plans found in the 
study was in use on nine central Iowa hog-pro­
ducing farms. The base rent in this case was 
$6.75 per acre, which the parties considered as 
representative of the prewar price of hogs. The 
rent for each year was the base rent, plus 25 cents 
for each dollar the per hundredweight price of 
hogs was in excess of the base price on a par­
ticular day. For example, if the price of hogs 
were $18.75 per hundredweight on the day ac­
cepted as the base day, the rent per acre would 
be $9.75— $6.75 plus one-fourth of the gain in 
price ($12.00) or $3.00. The plan is a compromise 
between completely flexible rents with respect to 
prices and the prevailing rent in the community. 
The use of the one-fourth ratio is a concession to 
the tenant’s alternative opportunity to rent land 
from other owners at the going price. But the 
tenants were willing to forego the advantage to 
be gained from renting on the current market 
for the reduction in the uncertainty as to the im­
pact of future price changes on their net income.
Actual operation of the plan is shown in table 
5. From 1940 through 1948, the plan eliminated 
the lag and the cash rent moved upward, with 
the price of hogs enabling the landlord to receive 
a higher return than he would have received had 
the farm been rented at market rates. The price 
of hogs dropped substantially in 1949 and the 
rent was consequently reduced. As the price of 
hogs remained relatively low during the 1949-52 
period, the rent remained below the rental market 
in the community. With the sharp upturn in the 
price of hogs in 1953, the rent was increased sub­
stantially. Thus, throughout the period, the land­
lord had a rent based upon current prices, and 
by the same method, the tenant’s net income was
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TABLE 5. COMPARISON OF AVERAGE CASH RENT PAID WITH 














(dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars)
1940..................... 5.30 —1.45 —0.36 6.39 6.14
1941..................... 9.20 2.45 0.61 7.36 6.41
1942..................... 13.10 6.35 1.58 8.33 6.60
1943..................... 13.80 7.05 1.76 8.51 7.31
1944..................... 13.20 6.45 1.61 8.36 7.89
1945..................... 14.00 7.25 1.81 8.56 8.20
1946.................... 17.50 10.75 2.68 9.43 8.45
1947..................... 23.80 . 17.05 4.26 11.01 8.53
1948..................... 22.80 16.05 4.01 10.81 9.86
1949..................... 17.50 10.75 2.68 9.43 10.34
1950..................... 17.70 10.95 2.74 9.49 10.31
1951..................... 19.70 12.95 3.24 9.99 11.77
1952..................... 17.40 10.65 2.66 9.41 11.53
1953..................... 24.00 17.25 4.31 11.06 13.28
* Average annual price received by Iowa farmers except for 1958, 
which is the September 15 estimate. Data supplied by Division of Live­
stock and Poultry Statistics, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. 
Dept. Agr.
t One-quarter of the difference between the per-hundredweight price 
and the base rent.
$ Data supplied by Division of Land Economics, Bureau of Agricul­
tural Economies, U. S. Dept. Agr.
protected from any decline in prices. But there 
was no protection from the failure of costs to 
decline with prices or the possibility that disease 
or other factors could have substantially reduced 
hog production. According to the landlord and 
tenant interviewed, the plan was functioning sat­
isfactorily.
O t h e r  R e n t  A d j u s t m e n t  P r o p o s a l s
Following the substantial decline in farm prices 
in the early 1930’s, a number of plans for keeping 
rent in line with changes in prices, costs and pro­
duction were developed in Iowa and nearby 
states.46 Some of these plans have definite ad­
vantages, along with definite shortcomings, but 
in either event, it is worthwhile to consider their 
features and see how the plans would function 
under different circumstances.
PLANS FOR RELATING RENT TO PRICES 
OF COMMODITIES
This type of plan was developed by at least four 
states in the Midwest in an attempt to alleviate 
the distress caused by failure of rents to adjust to 
falling prices. Three of these plans are quite 
similar and an analysis of one is applicable to the 
others.
In the Iowa plan, the basic arrangement pro­
vided for the two parties to agree upon a base 
rent, either for the farm or per acre, and to 
modify the rent in direct proportion to changes in 
a weighted index of 10 major Iowa farm com­
modities.47 For example, if the parties had agreed
4®See, for example: Millard Peck. A plan for adjusting of farm 
products to changes in the price of farm products. Iowa Agr. Exp. 
Sta. Bui. 295. 1932; W. L. Cavert. Adjusting of farm rentals to fluctu­
ating values. Minn. Agr. Ext. Ser. Cir. 42. 1933; H. C. M. Case and 
Joseph Ackerman. Farm leases in Illinois. 111. Agr. Ext. Ser. Cir. 474. 
1937; John F. Timmons. Landlord-tenant relationships in renting Mis­
souri farms. Mo. Agr. Exp. Sta. Bui. 409. 2d ed. 1946.
47Later, use of the 10 major commodity indexes was discontinued 
and the standard “ prices received”  index, based upon a larger number
upon a base rent of $6.00 per acre when the 
weighted price index was 80, the rent would be 
$9.00 when the index reached 120 (or 150 percent 
of the base index). Conversely, had the index 
declined to 60, the rent would be $4.50 (or 75 per­
cent of the base rent).
Arising from a definite need to bring land rent 
in line with lower prices of farm products, and 
appearing at a time when rigid rental rates were 
causing widespread hardship on Iowa farms, the 
plan was adopted by many landlords and ten­
ants.48 The apparent advantage was the determi­
nation of a rent that the tenant could pay and the 
landlord could collect. The plan was announced in 
1932 and put into use for the 1933 crop year by 
numerous landlords and tenants.
This adjustment provision provided only for 
changes in prices. Omission of the production as­
pects caused difficulty immediately after the plan 
was adopted. In 1934, a drouth reduced corn 
yields by almost half with the yield index declining 
from 112 in 1933 to 55 in 1934 (table 6). Prices, 
on the other hand, increased more than a third 
with the price index rising from 41 to 56 (table 
6). Thus, the tenant’s rent increased, although he 
had less income with which to meet his obliga­
tions. This combination of events placed a con­
siderable strain on the sliding-scale leases.
Similar, but more stringent, circumstances ex­
isted only 2 years later in 1936 when drouth 
again severely reduced yields. Prices, however, 
remained relatively unchanged—cash rent, conse­
quently, did not reflect the lower production and 
many tenants found it hard to meet the rent.49
of commodities, was substituted. Since most prices are highly correlated 
over time and the 10 major commodities have heavy weights in the 
other series, the differences in the rent adjustments were not ap­
preciable.
The formula for computing the rent:
_  , (current price index)Rent =  base rent - —;---------- ;  —3-------r-( base price index )
or, in the example cited above,
Rent =  $6.00 , Q2n° . -  =  $9.00
V oU )
Estimates of the number of flexible leases put into effect are not 
available but several hundred inquiries about the plan are on file at 
Iowa State College. Blank flexible lease forms were distributed by the 
college until 1951. Numerous inquiries are received each year for data 
to be used in computing the flexible rent.
Flexible leasing plans were also used extensively in Minnesota. _ As 
late as 1940, 11 percent of the cash leases in Minnesota had provisions 
for adjusting the rent on the basis of farm product prices. George 
A. Pond. Farm tenancy in Minnesota. Minn. Agr. Exp. Sta. Bui. 355. 
p. 30. 1940.
48See I. W. Arthur. Index cash rent—a plan to make sliding scale 
cash leases work. Iowa Farm Economist. 8:14-15. January 1942.
49Ibid. When a renewed interest in flexible leasing resulted from 
rising prices in the early part of World War II, Professor Arthur de­
veloped a provision designed to correct this deficiency. The provision 
requires that the landlord and tenant agree upon a normal corn yield 
for the farm and modify the rent in proportion to changes in the 
yield if the yield is 75 percent or less of the normal yield. Thus the 
rental computation becomes:
„  , ' (current price index) (current yield)Rent — base rent ■. , -  — — . - ■ — v —rr \ — ----- . . ,( base price index ) (normal yield)
if the ratio of current to. normal yield is less than 0.75. This correc­
tion factor would have reduced the rental commitment in 1934 and 1936, 
but would not have been applicable in 1947 when the corn yield of Iowa 
was 78.2 percent of the long-run average and prices increased by 29 
percent. This, however, is one of the years in which the decline in 
yield was offset almost perfectly by the rise in price—the value of the 
reduced crop at the new price was 1 percent greater than would have 
been the value of a crop of normal yield at the old price.
The 75 percent of normal yield is an arbitrary point of adjustment 
—any level could be used if agreement is reached between contracting 
parties. It should be noted, however, that this type of adjustment is 
onesided in that no provision is made for increasing the rent in those 
years when the land is unusually productive, that is, the “ bumper”  
crop years.
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TABLE 6. AVERAGE RENT PAID IN IOWA, AVERAGE RENT 
ADJUSTED FOR PRICE CHANGES AND AVERAGE RENT AD­
JUSTED FOR PRICE AND PRODUCTION CHANGES.
Year
Average cash 
rent per acre 
Iowa*










for price and 
yield changes?
1953 $13.64 187 $14.10 137 $19.3252 12.64 198 14.93 159 23.7451 12.29 216 16.29 111 18.0850 10.95 184 13.87 124 17.20
1949 11.06 178 13.42 118 15.8448 10.42 222 16.74 155 24.9547 9.51 211 15.91 78 12.4146 8.59 163 12.29 145 17.82
1945 8.46 135 10.18 111 11.3044 8.22 128 9.65 133 12.8343 7.49 132 9.95 140 13.9342 6.78 116 8.75 153 13.3941 6.20 90 6.79 131 8.89
1940 5.98 69 5.20 134 6.9739 5.80 67 5.05 134 6.7738 5.76 72 5.43 119 6.4637 5.57 93 7.01 114 7.9936 5.59 83 6.26 51 3.19
1935 5.07 83 6.26 98 6.1334 4.88 56 4.22 55 2.3233 4.33 41 3.09 112 3.4632 6.00 41 3.09 109 3.3731 7.31 61 4.60 84 3.86
1930 7.65 88 6.64 87 5.7829 7.75 103 7.77 101 7.8428 7.64 102 7.69 105 8.07
27 7.60 97 7.31 89 6.51
1926 7.54 100 7.54 100 7.54
Total $220.72 $250.33 $295.96
B. French and W. Chryst. Prices affecting Iowa farmers 1910-49. 
Dept. Econ. and Soc., Iowa State College, Ames. The 1950 through 
1953 observations are from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. 
Dept. Agr.
t  Adjusted rent =  base rent X ■cnrrent ^  indeX .
i  Index computed from data compiled by the Iowa Assessor Annual 
Farm Census. Department of Agriculture, Iowa. Yearbooks 28 through 
53. The 1953 observation is a preliminary estimate of the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, U. S. Dept. Agr.
§ Adjusted rent =  base rent X
(Current price index) (current yield index)
10,000
The way in which the sliding-scale rent would 
have functioned over a period of years is shown 
in table 6. A hypothetical situation is used in 
which 1926 average Iowa cash rent is taken as 
a base and adjusted according to changes in the 
index of Iowa prices received. From 1926 through 
1930, use of the price correction factor would have 
made little difference in the amount of rent paid. 
Following 1930, however, the price-corrected rent 
fell more rapidly and reached a lower level than 
actual rent paid, the price-corrected rent in 1932 
($3.09) being about half o f the actual rent paid 
($6.00). In 1935, 1936 and 1937, the price-ad­
justed rent would have been greater than the 
average rent paid, but it would have defined with 
the “ slump” of 1938 and remained lower than the 
average rent paid until the beginning of the war 
years. But, with the increase in prices accompany­
ing the war, adjusted cash rent would have ex­
ceeded the average cash rent paid from 1941 
through 1949. In 1949, the adjusted cash rent was 
substantially reduced as a result of the price de­
cline.
ADJUSTMENT FOR PRICE AND PRODUCTION
Table 6 also offers a comparison of rents ad­
justed for price only with rents adjusted for both 
price and production. The adjustment for both 
price and production is obtained by applying a 
yield correction factor to the price corrected base 
rent.50 Thus, the series indicates what the base 
rent would have been in each year had it been ad­
justed for changes in prices received by farmers 
and changes in production as reflected by corn 
yields. A comparison of the series illustrates the 
need for the use of both factors in the adjustment 
process.
Both processes offer essentially the same result 
for the period through 1933. In 1934, however, the 
first year to place a strain upon the sliding-scale 
rent, the two processes resulted in substantially 
different outcomes—the price-adjusted rent, in 
the above example, increased with the increase 
in prices from $3.09 to $4.22. Had production 
changes been taken into account throughout the 
period, the rent would have declined from $3.46 
to $2.33. The difference in results is even more 
pronounced in the 1936 situation. The two tech­
niques offered approximately the same rent in 
1935, i.e., $6.25 for the price plan and $6.10 for 
the price plus production plan. The price level 
remained unchanged between 1935 and 1936 with 
the consequence that the price-corrected rent re­
mained unchanged^ Corn yields, however, de­
clined nearly 50 percent, and, had this been taken 
into account, the rent would have been adjusted 
downward to $3.16. Similarly, in 1947, adjust­
ment for price alone would have resulted in an 
increase in rent, while consideration of both price 
and production would have reduced the rent about 
one-third. The same circumstances were applic­
able in 1953 when the adjustment for prices alone 
would have resulted in a reduction in rent sub­
stantially less than the reduction necessitated by 
inclusion of production changes in the adjustment 
formula.
The argument is sometimes advanced that the 
landlord also has commitments which must be 
met and that use of these flexible schemes unduly 
favors the tenant. If viewed over the long run, 
this hypothesis does not appear to be true. For 
example, considering the hypothetical example 
used in table 6, either of the flexible plans dis- 
cussed_ above would have yielded considerably 
more income than was actually paid for Iowa 
farmland for the period under observation. The 
sum of the average annual rents actually paid 
for the 1926-53 period amounted to $220.72, 
whereas the sum of the price-corrected rents is 
$250.33 and the sum of the price- and production- 
corrected rents is $295.96. In the long run, any
soThe formula for computing the price and production corrected rent is:
Ren£ _  jjase rcnt (current yield index) (current price index)
( base yield index ) ( base price index )
It is recognized, of course, that for a single commodity this is identical 
with the share rent in that rent paid in physical equivalents in any 
given year will hold the same relation to the total physical product 
as the base rent in physical equivalents was to the total physical product 
m the base year.
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successful adjustment plan must provide a return 
to the landlord greater than the fixed cash rental 
because of the assumption of additional risks on 
his part. The tenant has protection from major 
unforeseen changes in prices and production and 
he must decide, from the viewpoint of his capital 
and equity position, whether this protection is 
worth the additional cost.
THE MISSOURI MULTIPLE COMMODITY PLAN
The Missouri plan takes a somewhat different 
approach to the problem of adjusting rent.51 The 
landlord and tenant estimate the gross income 
of each major enterprise at the beginning of the 
lease year and agree upon the base per-unit price 
of each of the major farm products produced on 
the farm and on a base rent per acre. At the end 
of the lease year, when the rent is due, the per- 
unit price of each commodity is determined, and 
the percentage change is applied against the esti­
mated income from the enterprise. The base rent 
is then adjusted by the ratio of the revised esti­
mated gross income to the original estimated 
gross income.
An example of the use of the plan is presented 
in table 7. The assumption is made that the part­
ies agreed upon a rent of $12 per acre based upon 
expectations of a $6,000 gross farm income. Dur­
ing the production period, prices changed in such 
a way that the gross income was $4,605, or $1,395
SITimmons, op. cit. pp. 21-24. Requests for over 10,000 of the lease 
forms based upon this plan were received by the Missouri Extension 
Service.
TABLE 7. ILLUSTRATION OF CASH RENT ADJUSTMENT MADE 
BECAUSE OF CHANGE IN FARM PRICE LEVEL BETWEEN TIME 


















Hogs................ 13,000 $12.00 $ 9.00 —25 $2,250
Beef.................. 1,200 15.00 12.00 960
Butterfat.......... 1,200 0.72 0.60 —17 995
Eggs................. 600 0.45 0.30 —33 400
$6,000 $4,605
1 395Percent decrease in income =  =  23.2
6,000
Adjusted rent =  $12 RfF$12 ( )  J  =$9.22
* A modification of a table appearing in Timmons, op. cit., p. 22.
less than the expected income. The rent under the 
plan would then be correspondingly reduced by 
1,395/6,000, or 23.2 percent ($2.78), to $9.22 per 
acre. Had prices risen by the proportions shown 
in table 7, the rent would have been adjusted up­
ward by 23.2 percent, or to $14.78. The advan­
tage of such a plan is twofold: (1) Rent is associ­
ated directly with the enterprises of the farm 
business and (2) rent is based upon the current 
income, as affected by prices, of the farm.
An alternative provision is offered whereby the 
cash rent can be adjusted for changes in both 
prices and production (table 8 ).52 In the use of 
this plan, the landlord and tenant determine the 
cash rent by the use of accepted shares and furth­
er agree upon a normal yield for each crop for 
the farm. The rent is then adjusted in line with 
the deviation of the current county yield from the 
long-run average yield. Thus, if, as shown in 
table 8, the landlord and tenant had agreed to 
base the rent for corn land upon a 40-bushel yield, 
and the county average yield for a given year was 
only 90 percent of the long-run average, rent 
would be paid upon the basis of a 36-bushel yield. 
Similar adjustments would be made for other 
commodities produced on the farm, with the total 
rent for the farm being the sum of the adjusted 
rents for each crop.
The plan has several advantages in that the 
cash rent is adjusted to current production and 
current prices. One of the more desirable fea­
tures, however, is the partial dissociation of pro­
duction on the farm from rent. This enables the 
tenant to receive the return to his management 
if superior, or conversely, frees his landlord of 
its cost if inferior. This feature is incorporated 
in another plan presented later.
THE CONTRIBUTIONS APPROACH
This plan seeks to divide the farm income in 
the same ratio as the parties contribute to the 
farm firm.53 The value of the contributions may
52Timmons, op. cit. p. 23.
63See: B. H. Kristjanson and E. Solberg. Farm rental bargaining 
in North Dakota. N. D. Agr. Exp. Sta. Bui. 372. March 1952.
Max Tharp. Your farm lease. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 
U. S. Dept. Agr. Misc. Pub. No. 627. June 1949.
Owen Brough, Bernard Parrish and Chas. Elkington. Farm leasing 
under irrigation. Bureau of Reclamation, United States Department of 
Interior, Wash. State College and Farmers Home Administration, U. S. 
Dept. Agr. Ephrata, Washington. February 1952.
J. B. Cunningham. What is a fair lease? Hoard’s Dairyman 92:20. 
1948.
C. B. Ratchford. Determining the rent in share and cash rental ar­
rangements. So. Farm Mgt. Ext. Pub. No. 4. Raleigh. 1952.
Rental Arrangements in the Coastal Plain. N. C. Agr. Ext. Serv. 
Cir. No. 370. August 1952.
TABLE 8. ILLUSTRATION OF CASH RENT ADJUSTMENT MADE BECAUSE OF CHANGE IN CROP PRICES AND PRODUCTION BE­
TWEEN TIME RENT CONTRACT IS DRAWN AND TIME RENT MUST BE PAID.*








for farm Price Per acre Total rent
Com...... 10 H 5.0 40 90 36 $ 1.50 $54.00 $270.00Wheat. . . . 10 ü 3.3 20 75 15 1.60 24.00 80.00
Meadow.. 10 M 5.0 2 50 1 16.00 16.00 80.00Pasture.. 10 X X X X X X 10.00 100.00
Buildings X X X X X X X X 300.00
$830.00
* Table reproduced from Timmons, op. cit., p. 23.
be measured: (1) by allowing the actual cash out­
lay for the item supplied or (2) when no cash 
outlay in involved, by allowing the “ opportunity 
cost” of the investment or expenditure.54 These 
total costs are then summed for each party and 
the gross receipts are divided in the ratio that 
each party’s costs hold to the total outlay. The 
mechanism of the method is illustrated in table 9.
In this example, the opportunity costs on the 
landlord’s investments, plus his actual cash out­
lays, amount to $3,315, or 30.0 percent of the 
total estimated operating expenses of the farm. 
Consequently, of the gross farm income of 
$15,000, he receives 30 percent, or $4,500. The 
tenant, on the other hand, was responsible for 
70 percent of the contributions and thus receives 
70 percent of the income, or $10,500.
This provision allows for the predetermination 
of the method of division; the variation in prices 
and production are accounted for in the same 
way as in a share agreement. Also, variation in 
costs are taken into account, and the procedure 
is relatively simple and should be feasible admin­
istratively. The division of the net return is 
known in advance with a fair degree of accuracy 
and is as certain as it is possible to determine 
contractually.
In a broader framework, however, the plan has 
shortcomings. First, it is redundant in that land 
values are used, in part, to determine the return 
to land. The land values are themselves a function 
of the return to land. Overestimating the value of 
land could result in higher rents, which would 
result in still higher values, which would result 
again in higher rents, and the process would be 
repeated. But unless the method were adopted 
upon a wide scale, this is not likely to be a serious 
limitation.
54The “ oppportunity cost”  is the income foregone by devoting the 
resource to a particular use. For example, if $1,000 invested in stocks 
or bonds would earn $50 in a year, then the “ opportunity cost”  of using 
this resource in a farming operation is $50.
TABLE 9. THE CONTRIBUTIONS APPROACH TO THE DIVISION 

































3 315Landlord’s contribution relative to the total: - - ’ ■ =  30.0%11,050
Division of income:
Income: $15,000
Landlord’s share =  $15,000 (0.30) =  $4,500 
Tenant’s share =  $15,000 (0.70) =  $10,500
Second, the use of land values means that rent 
is determined by bargaining between buyers and 
sellers of land rather than between landlords and 
tenants. Land values are based upon the expected 
return over a long period of time while the tenant 
operator may only be concerned with those pro­
duction periods in the immediate future. Thus, 
basing rent upon land values in a period of rising 
prices results in the land buyer’s anticipations 
with respect to future land returns becoming a 
current reality to the tenant. To the extent that 
the buyer’s anticipations diverge from current 
realizations, a cost is incurred which, through 
the contribution approach, may be shifted to the 
tenant.
ADJUSTING RENTS FOR PRICE AND PRODUCTION 
CHANGES
Efforts have been made in the past to develop 
methods of adjusting rent that will (1) protect 
tenants and landlords from adverse effects of 
changes in prices and yields, (2) provide tenants 
with the maximum incentive to use their man­
agerial abilities to the utmost and (3) protect 
landlords from the consequences of inferior ten­
ant-management decisions.55 These plans have 
features of both the cash and share methods of 
renting since they propose to adjust the rent in 
accordance with changes in prices and production 
yet permit the tenant’s return to reflect the quality 
of his management.
To identify the return to management with the 
tenant, the adjusting mechanism for changes in 
production must be partially dissociated from the 
production of the specific farm. To this end, town­
ship, county, crop-reporting district or state yield 
data may be used. Adjustment for production 
changes is made by correcting the base rent for 
the annual deviation from the area average.
Further, recognition must be given to the fact 
that under average management and because of 
technological advancements (such as hybrid seeds, 
new fertilizers and new knowledge with respect to 
weed control, cultivation and similar items) yields 
have an upward trend over time. Thus, if the long- 
run average yield were used as a base, the current 
yield under average management would usually 
be considerably in excess of the long-time average 
yield and this would necessitate an annual adjust­
ment in favor of the landlord. This difficulty 
would be avoided if a moving average were used 
for the base yield.
It is probable that landlords and tenants do not 
desire to make adjustments for minor changes in 
yields—that they could agree upon a zone of per­
missible variation in production and make only 
those adjustments that would correct the rent 
back to the nearest mutually accepted limit of 
tolerance.
An application of this technique may be seen in 
the operation of a lease where it is assumed that 
landlord and tenant have agreed to make the rent
55Timmons, op. cit. p. 21.
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TABLE 10. DETERMINATION OF RENT FOR A HYPOTHETICAL 








80 40 35 (bu.) 1,400 (bu.) $ 0.70 $ 980
40 20 30 (bu.) 600 (bu.) 0.35 210
40 20 1.25 (tons) 25 (tons) 20.00 500
Pasture and 
farmstead. . . 40 X X X 7.50 300
Total. . . 200 X X X $1,990
$1 990Base rent =  -^ Ä  =  *9.95 per acre
* Yields and prices approximately those obtained in 1926. Data round­
ed to achieve simplicity of presentation. Corn-corn-oats-clover. rotation 
assumed.
flexible with respect to prices and to make cor­
rections for changes in production when the state 
(or crop-reporting district, township or county) 
average yield deviates more than 15 percent from 
a 5-year moving average (see table 11). The cor­
rection for price changes will be the same as dis­
cussed in previous provisions. During bumper 
crop years in which the yield deviates to 125 per­
cent of the moving average, the yield correction 
factor would be 125/115 and the rent would be 
increased by 8.7 percent; in years of drouths or 
wet seasons when the yield is only 75 percent of 
the moving average, the correction factor is
TABLE 11. DETERMINATION OF A CORRECTION FACTOR FOR 
CHANGES IN PRODUCTION USING A MOVING AVERAGE OF 











1953......... '. . . 53.5 50.6 105.7
52............... 62.2 52.0 119.6 1.04
51............... 43.1 45.7 94.3
1950............... 48.2 48.4 99.6
49............... 46.1 47.5 97.0
48............... 60.5 48.6 124.5 1.08
47............... 30.5 47.5 64.2 0.76
53 4 106.2





1940............. 51.0 42.8 119.2 1.04
39............... 52.2 40.3 129.5 1.13
38............... 46.3 34.2 135.4 1.18
37............... 44.6 33.6 132.7 1.15
36............... 20.0 33.3 60.0 0.71
35 8 107.3










24............... 28.0 40.5 69.1 0.81
22
43^0
* Iowa Annual Assessor’s Reports. 1953 observation, Bureau of Agri­
cultural Economics, U. S. Dept. Agr. Preliminary estimate.
t Derived by dividing the current yield as a percent of moving aver­
age by a base of 115 for those years when the percentage is in excess 
of 115; by 85 for those years when the percentage is less than 85.
75/85, which would reduce the rent 11.8 percent 
or to 88.2 percent of its uncorrected value.56
An example of the use of the plan is shown in 
tables 10 and 11. Here it is assumed that landlord 
and tenant agree that the base rent will be the 
amount that the landlord would have received 
under the crop-share plan with average manage­
ment (table 10) ,57 It is assumed that they will 
further agree that the rent will be adj usted in ac­
cordance with changes in the prices of all farm 
products and changes in production when such 
changes exceed the range of permissible variation, 
here assumed to be from 85 to 115 percent of a 
5-year moving average. Corn yields are used as 
indicators of production changes. The method of 
determining the correction factor is shown in 
table 12.
The mechanism of the price-adjusting feature 
is the same as the one previously discussed and in 
widespread use at one time in Iowa. Thus, from 
1926 through 1933, the rent paid on the farm used 
in this example would have been the same as the 
flexible cash rent, using $9.95 as a 1926 base.
56This method differs from those discussed earlier in three respects; 
(1) adjustment can be either in favor of the landlord or tenant, de­
pending upon the circumstances, (2) the trendy in yields is taken into 
account and (3) the adjustment is less abrupt in that the closest limit 
is used as the new base. Under the other plan, a 1-percent change in 
yield, from 74.5 to 75.5 of normal, would result in a 25-percent change 
in rent—with this plan the change would be from 88.8 percent to 87.6 
percent, or 1.2 percent.
5?This would represent the maximum as the landlord would not hear 
those expenses commonly borne by the crop-share landlord. Actually, 
the initial rent would be expected to be more than the cash rent oppor­
tunity but less than the share rent.
TABLE 12. DETERMINATION OF RENT UNDER A PLAN PRO­












for price and 
production!
(dollars) (dollars)
1Q53 197 19.60 19.60
52............... 198 19.70 1.04 20.49**
51 216 21.49 21.49
50 184 18.31 18.31
178 17.71 17.71
48............... 222 22.09 1.08 23.86**
47............... 211 20.99 0.76 15.95**
40 163 16.22 16.22
1945............... 135 13.43 0.98 13.16**
44 128 12.74 12.74
42 132 13.13 13.13
42 116 11.54 11.54
41......... 90 8.96 8.96
1940............... 69 6.87 1.04 7.14**
39............... 67 6.67 1.13 7.54**
38............... 72 7.16 1.18 8.45**
37............... 93 9.25 1.15 10.64**
36............... 83 8.26 0.71 5.86**
1925 83 8.26 8.26
34............... 56 5.57 0.73 4.07**
22 41 4.08 4.08
22 41 4.08 4.08
21 61 6.07 6.07
1920 88 8.76 8.76
29 103 10.24 10.24
28 102 10.15 10.15
27 97 9.65 9.65
20 100 9.95 9.95
Total...... 330.93 328.10
* Weighted average of all farm prices received for Iowa. 1953 ob­
servation. Preliminary estimate from Bureau of Agricultural Eco­
nomics, U. S. Dept. Agr.
t Base rent ($9.95) multiplied by index of prices, 
j  Corn yield as a percent of 115 percent of 5-year moving averages 
for those yields in excess of 115 percent; as a percent of 85 percent 
of the moving average for those observations less than 85 percent of 
the moving average.
§ Production correction applied to price corrected rent.
** Rent adjusted for unusual changes in production.
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In 1934, however, the production-adjusting device 
would have come into use and the rent paid would 
have been 73 percent of the price-adjusted rent. 
This is determined by using 85 percent of the 
moving average yield of corn as a base for cor­
rection. Similarly, in 1936, when the ordinary 
flexible lease would have provided no relief to 
the tenant although yields were substantially 
below normal, adjustment for the production 
change would have reduced the rent to 71 percent 
of the rent based upon price flexibility alone. The 
following year, when both prices and yields in­
creased substantially, there would have been a 
substantial adjustment in favor of the landlord. 
In the remaining years of the late thirties, the 
production adjustment and the price adjustment 
features would have worked in opposite directions. 
One would have provided the landlord with some 
of the benefits of unusually good crops, while the 
other protected the tenant from the effects of low 
prices. To the extent that these effects did not 
offset each other, the difference was reflected in 
the rent. The rent was adjusted for production 
changes in 1947 because of the drouth and again 
in 1948 because of the good crop.
In applying this technique to an example cov­
ering the period from 1926 through 1953, the pro­
duction adjustments are distributed in such a way 
that those benefiting the tenant nearly offset those 
benefiting the landlord. Thus, the landlord who 
rents his farm over a long period is left in nearly 
the same position as he would have been had he 
rented under the flexible cash plan; the flexible 
cash plan would have yielded $330.93 per acre, 
while the combination price and production plan 
would have yielded $328.10, or $2.83 less. This 
difference would have amounted to $0.10 per acre 
per year. While few tenants rent for such a pro­
longed period, all of the tenants would have had 
protection from the adverse prices and yields.
A further feature of the plan is that while the 
landlord receives a rent that is related to the share 
rent under average management, a tenant with 
superior managerial ability is able to retain all 
of the returns due this superiority. Thus, in the 
example used above, had the tenant, through the 
early adoption of improved methods of cultiva­
tion, the increased use of new types of fertilizers 
and plant varieties, and the use of recently de­
veloped insecticides, succeeded in increasing his 
yields more rapidly than the average farmer, he 
would have been permitted to retain these bene­
fits ; conversely, to the extent that the tenant fails 
to adopt new methods at the average rate, he 
alone bears the cost and not the landlord. In ad­
dition to providing a rent that is based upon cur­
rent price and production relationships, the plan 
provides an incentive for reduction of the “ in­
formational lag,” i.e., the difference that exists be­
tween knowledge and practice.
A d j u s t i n g  R e n t s  f o r  P r ic e , C o s t  a n d  
P r o d u c t io n  C h a n g e s
Methods can be devised for stabilizing the net 
return ratio by reducing the effects of changes in
prices, costs and production. When these changes 
are known with complete accuracy, their effect 
upon the net return ratio can be eliminated en­
tirely. The process of reducing the variation in 
the net return ratio is much more hazardous, how­
ever, when these changes must be estimated. 
While these processes have not been refined to 
the point that their general use can be recom­
mended, the basic mechanism is presented to stim­
ulate discussion and further study.
DETERMINATION OF THE ADJUSTMENT NEEDED
The amount that must be transferred between 
the landlord and tenant may be determined arith­
metically. The amount of the adjustment, A, may 
be determined from the following formula:
A =  N (ARf — ACf) + aCi — aR! 
where N is the net return ratio to be stabilized; 
ARf is the change in farm gross return or effect 
of changes in prices and production; ACf indi­
cates the change in farm costs; aCi measures the 
change in the landlord’s costs; and aR i repre­
sents the changes in the landlord’s gross returns. 
Depending upon the nature of the changes, the 
adjustment (A) may be either positive or nega­
tive. If positive, an amount must be transferred 
from tenant to landlord in order to restore the 
original net return ratio; if the adjustment (A) 
is negative, the transfer must be made to the ten­
ant.58
The cost and return data from an Iowa live­
stock-share rented farm for 1943 through 1945 
are shown in table 13. The net return ratio in the 
first year (1943) is 49.9, 57.1 in the second year 
and 51.2 in the third year. If it is assumed that 
the landlord and tenant desire to stabilize the net 
return ratio through time at the level of the first 
year, the formula above may be used. Thus, in 
1944, the computation of the adjustment would 
be:
A=0.499 (— 1,525—3,459) +  1,226 —
(— 864) =  — $397.
The computation for the adjustment factor in 
1945 would be :
A =  0.499 (— 3,727 — 1,044) +  383 
— (— 1,928) =  —$70.
The application of the adjustment is shown in 
table 14. By transferring $397 from landlord to 
tenant in 1944, the landlord’s share of the farm
58The following equation represents the net return ratio (N)
f r - q  - n
R( — Ct— Ci
where Ri is the gross return to the landlord, Ci is the landlord’s costs, 
Rf is the gross return to the total farming operation and Ct is the 
tenant’s costs, all in the base year. The rent adjustment (A ) is added 
to the landlord’s net return to stabilize N when prices, costs and pro­
duction have changed, or:
______(Ri '+  ARi) — (Ci +  A Ci) +  A
(Ri +  ARf) — (Ct +  ACt) — (Ci +  A Ci)
when ARi is the change in the landlord’s gross return; ACi is the change 
in the landlord’s costs; ARf is the change in the farm’s gross return; 
ACt is the change in the tenant’s costs; and ACi is the change in the 
landlord’s costs.
From the two equations, it is apparent that:
A =  N ( ARf — ACf) +  ACi — ARi.
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TABLE 13. INCOME AND COST DATA FROM LIVESTOCK-SHARE RENTED FARMS FROM 1943 TO 1945 WITH CHANGES IN INCOME
AND COSTS BETWEEN 1943 AND 1944, AND 1943 AND 1945.
Year
Gross income Costs Net income Net income 



























































net return would have been reduced from 57.1 
percent to 49.9 percent. A similar transfer of $70 
in 1945 would have resulted in the landlord re­
ceiving 49.9 percent of the net farm income -— the 
same share that he received in 1943.
The formula for determining the adjustment is 
a general method, applicable to both the cash and 
share types of renting. While the example used 
in this section was taken from the records of a 
livestock-share farm, the same technique is ap­
plicable to cash renting arrangements. When the 
rent is paid in cash, Ri becomes the difference 
between the rent paid in the base year and the 
rent paid in the current year. The changes in total 
farm returns, total farm costs and the landlord’s 
costs are the other relevant variables.
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE METHOD
Complete data are needed to use this adjust­
ment technique. If the landlord and tenant have 
the data in a form sufficiently complete to use the 
method cited above, they are in position to use a 
shorter, and more direct means of computing the 
adjustment necessary to restore the basic net re­
turn ratio. The simple plan is to apply the ac­
cepted net return ratio to the farm net return as 
determined from the records, compare the amount 
each party should have with what he has received 
and make the appropriate transfer.
If, however, the farm records are not main­
tained in a form that the direct method of compu­
tation can be used, it is necessary to estimate the 
changes in returns and costs. This may be done 
by using base amounts and correcting them by 
index numbers. For example, to take changes in 
prices and costs into account, the returns in the 
base year are increased or lowered by changes in 
the index of value of livestock products sold in
TABLE 14. COMPARISON OF ADJUSTED AND UNADJUSTED 
















49.91944 5,553 3,172 —397 2,775 57.1
1945 5,766 2,951 — 70 2,881 51.2 49.9
Iowa if the farm is a livestock farm, or the index 
of the value of all farm products sold if the farm 
is of the general type. Estimation of changes in 
costs may be similar in that changes in the base 
costs of the farm operation and the landlord may 
be estimated by using changes in the index of 
production costs.
The use of index numbers in the adjustment 
computation process is hazardous since the change 
in the series may not closely approximate the 
change actually experienced on a specific farm. 
If this is true, use of the above-described method 
of rent adjustment may contribute to increased 
variability of the net return ratio rather than to 
its stabilization. At this time, it is apparent that 
any widespread use of a plan to adjust the net 
return ratio on the basis of changes in indexes of 
prices, costs and production must await the devel­
opment of indexes dealing with regional measures 
of changes in returns by type of farming, costs by 
type of farming, landlord costs by type of tenure 
and similar related items.
S o m e  R e n t - A d j u s t m e n t  E x p e r i e n c e s  
i n  O t h e r  C o u n t r i e s
The problem of keeping farm rentals function­
ing effectively in a changing environment is not 
unique to Iowa or to the United States. Many 
countries have recently made interesting modifica­
tions in rental provisions.
Several northern European countries have en­
acted landlord-tenant legislation. In preparing 
such legislation, it was recognized that tenant 
mobility, caused principally by the dissolution of 
rental contracts in an effort to adjust rental situ­
ations, decreased the output from those resources 
committed to agricultural production. In light of 
this effect, steps have been taken in some countries 
to increase the length of tenure expectation of ten­
ant operators. This has been accomplished by 
establishing a statutory minimum for the length 
of lease ; in France, the minimum length of lease 
is 9 years;59 in the Netherlands, 6 to 12 years is 
the minimum term, depending upon the improve-
59L. Prault. Les baux ruraux. Federation Nationale de la Propriété 
Agricole, Paris, n. d. Sec. 17.
Albert Alexander Costa. Tenant-landlord relations and French law. 
Paper presented at the Conference on World Land Tenure Problems. 
_University of Wisconsin, Madison. Nov. 5, 1951. (mimeo rept.)
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ments on the land ;60 and in England, while no 
minimum length is set, the tenant cannot be 
evicted as long as he farms the land in a way 
that is satisfactory to the Ministry of Agricul­
ture.61
Following the lengthening of the lease term by 
statute, with the consequent elimination of the 
avenue of annual re-negotiations and of changing 
partners as means of adjusting rent, the neces­
sity of providing flexibility in rental rates assumed 
increasing importance. In response to this in­
creased need, each country developed procedures 
providing for the right of petition for rental 
change by either party.
IN  FRANCE
In France, an advisory commission on leases 
made up of landlords, tenants and public officials 
was formed for each of the political subdivisions 
(corresponding to counties in the United States). 
This commission established a normal rent for 
each farm in its jurisdiction. The landlord and 
tenant are free to bargain in regard to the rent in 
the usual manner. If, however, a rent is accepted 
that departs from the norm more than 10 percent, 
either party may petition the courts for a re- 
evaluation of the rent, in which case acceptance 
of the decision of the court, based upon the ad­
visory commission’s findings, is compulsory. The 
rent is fixed for the duration of the contract and 
cannot be changed by negotiation between the 
parties without approval of the court. In the 
event of a poor crop year, however, the tenant 
may petition the court to have his rental obliga­
tion reduced. Also, either party may, at the end 
of each year, have the contract reopened by the 
courts for a re-evaluation of the rent. Thus, 
whenever the rent, and consequently, the division 
of returns, exceeds the limits of tolerance of either 
party, he may look to the courts for redress; and, 
in determining the adjustments, the court has the 
counsel of specialists in rental matters.
The French law provides for inter-lease type 
changes without changes in farms or changes 
in tenants. Share renting is permitted, but at 
the end of each 3-year period of the lease, either 
party may request the courts to convert the share 
lease to a standard form lease as described above. 
If such a request originates with the tenant, the 
landlord can defeat the change by personally as­
suming the operation of the farm.
IN ENGLAND
The British law is similar in many respects to 
the French. Again, the parties are free to bar­
gain, but either may request that the amount of 
rent be submitted for arbitration.62 Upon receiv­
ing a request for arbitration, the Minister of Agri-
SOCornelius D. Scheer. An appraisal of the place of equitable tenancy 
arrangements in a progressive agriculture (The Netherlands). Paper 
presented at the Conference on World Land Tenure Problems. Univer­
sity of Wisconsin, Madison. Nov. 5, 1951. (mimeo rept.)
61 John Stuart Hill. Equitable tenancy arrangements in progressive 
agriculture. Paper presented at the Conference on World Land Tenure 
Problems. University of Wisconsin, Madison. Nov. 29, 1951. (mimeo 
rept.)
62Hill, op. cit.
culture, or his delegate, will appoint an arbitrator 
with specialized training to examine the conditions 
of the lease and set a rental value on the holdings. 
The decision of the arbitrator is final. A request 
for arbitration cannot be submitted more often 
than once each 3 years.
IN THE NETHERLANDS
The Dutch land law provides that every rent 
contract must be approved by an administrative 
body known as the Land Chamber, which is 
formed from landowners, tenants, members of 
the judiciary and economists.63 The parties are 
free to negotiate, but the amount of the rent 
must be approved by the Land Chamber. Such 
approval is not forthcoming unless “ . . . the gen­
eral interests of agriculture are not hurt and the 
net revenue to be expected when management is 
proper guarantees the tenant a fair gain.64 The 
rent is based upon the expected net return of the 
farm and the tenant’s claim on the net income 
for family living and production expenses is con­
sidered a prior claim.
The administrative procedure is similar to ar­
rangements in France and Britain. Either party 
may appeal to a special court, made up in the 
same way as the Land Chamber, which deals ex­
clusively with rental problems. The parties, either 
separately or together, may request a revision in 
the rent each 3 years.
P o s s ib l e  U s e  o f  R e n t a l  C o m m i s s i o n s
The role of the rental advisory commission used 
extensively in other countries might be further 
examined for possible use in the United States. 
In Iowa, hundreds of letters are received each 
year by the Iowa State College, requesting in­
formation on rental rates and agreements, and 
extension service personnel counsel additional 
hundreds. Throughout the United States, a siza­
ble number of studies designed to find answers to 
rental problem are being carried on by state agri­
cultural experiment stations and the U. S. Depart­
ment of Agriculture, and many publications deal­
ing with tenure arrangements are distributed 
each year in answer to requests from landlords 
and tenants.
Despite the appreciable magnitude of this ac­
tivity, little attention is directed toward the prob­
lems of a specific landlord and tenant combination. 
This lack is one of necessity; funds and personnel 
must be extended as far as possible, with the 
result that tenure studies can only develop the 
appropriate generalizations and leave the specific 
applications to individuals. It would seem, there­
fore, that there is need for another type of service 
in the farm rental field—one that would be avail­
able to landlords and tenants to assist them in 
solving specific rental problems.
Such a service, offered through a rental advisory 




three principal needs: (1) exchange of informa­
tion, (2) advice and (3) arbitration. Considering 
these in order, the exchange of information would 
be with respect to the availabilty of farms or ten­
ants. The advisory board could act as a clearing 
house for tenants seeking farms and for landlords 
seeking tenants. The landlord could list his farm 
with the board, describing its resources and giving 
his preferences with respect to the rental arrange­
ment. The tenant seeking a farm would give 
information on such items as age, experience, 
amount of labor available and quantity and type 
of machinery and livestock. With this data avail­
able, the board would be in a position to provide 
landlords and tenants with a wider range of op­
portunities than are generally known to individual 
landlords and tenants.65 In a recent survey in 
north-cental Iowa, 88 percent of the tenants and 
62 percent of the landlords viewed the idea of a 
landlord-tenant exchange with favor.66
In fulfilling its second function, advice, the 
board in its work with rentals would gain knowl­
edge with respect to the productivity of resources 
and the operation of rental arrangements. From 
this position, they would be prepared to advise 
on measures necessary to establish the appropri­
ate level of rent. Further, they could make recom­
mendations with respect to adjustments necessary 
to keep the division of net returns within the 
limits of tolerance of landlords and tenants and 
to achieve a reduction in tenant mobility through 
the maintenance of a workable situation. It would 
be expected that such a board of public-minded 
citizens would be alert to the development of 
modifications needed to permit adoption of tech­
nological innovations and to insure proper land 
use. Additional service could be rendered upon 
request, in checking the agreement for omission 
of relevant items and the inadvertent inclusion 
of provisions which might become a source of 
conflict between contracting parties.
A third area of operation of the board would 
be to serve in the capacity of mediator in any 
disputes arising between the contracting parties. 
The board, with its personnel having competence 
with respect to the many aspects of farm tenancy, 
would be a logical body in which to vest the arbi­
tration function.
Development of a system of advisory boards 
would require considerable time. One system of 
organization would provide for the board to be 
composed of landlords and tenants, serving with­
out pay as public citizens with the assistance of 
regular public employees. The debt adjustment 
boards of the 1930’s, FHA Advisory Committees 
and County Extension Program Committees are a 
few examples of citizens serving in public capaci­
ties similar to that required for a rental advisory 
board. So that the rental advisory boards might 
render their greatest service, attention should
^Some pioneer work in developing this service has been initiated 
in Iowa. Landlord and tenant exchanges have been organized in two 
Iowa counties. See: John F. Timmons. Improving farm rental arrange­
ments in Iowa. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bui. 393. 1953. p. 82.
66Loc. cit.
be given to the creation of the appropriate ma­
chinery several years in advance of the emergence 
of serious rental problems. Failure to be in posi­
tion to deal effectively with the problems created 
by the rigidity of land costs in a declining price 
economy would increase the severity of the conse­
quences of economic difficulty on farm people.
S o m e  R u l e s  f o r  M a k i n g  R e n t  A d j u s t m e n t s
This section reviews some of the conditions that 
became apparent during the course of this study 
and are helpful in the selection and carrying out 
of a flexible renting plan. Factors entering into 
the rent-adjustment provision can only be estab­
lished by negotiation between the parties, but in 
these negotiations several conditions should be 
taken into account. These conditions are discussed 
briefly as follows:
Provision be determined ahead of the crop year 
and set forth in writing. To avoid confusion, the 
rent-adjustment provisions should be worked out 
in advance of the term covered by the lease. 
Ample time should be devoted to consideration 
of the wants of the two parties and development 
of the mechanics of adjustment. Further, the de­
sires of the parties are much more nearly alike 
ahead of an abnormal change in price or produc­
tion. Thereafter, one of the parties would find 
himself in an unfavorable position asking for an 
adjustment in the rent.
Setting the agreement forth in writing will be 
helpful in at least three ways. First, it will assist 
the parties in arriving at agreement on the 
process to be used in adjusting the rents; second, 
it will serve as an understanding throughout the 
period of the lease; and third, it will provide a 
means of obtaining enforcement of the provision, 
if difficulties should arise at the time of settle­
ment.
Provision to encourage efficient use of resources. 
It is in the interest of landlord, tenant and the 
public that the leasing system provide an incen­
tive for the best use of resources. To this end, 
flexibility in the leasing system is essential ; the 
prospect of large losses arising through changes 
in prices, costs and production can act as an effec­
tive deterrent to expansion of the farm business 
to the most profitable level. If this be the case, 
the income of the contracting parties is reduced 
and the quantity of farm products available from 
the resources devoted to agriculture is less than 
the maximum.67
Provision made for changes in prices. Within 
a score of years, the Iowa Farm Price Index var­
ied from a low of 41 (1932 and 1933) to a high 
of 222 (1948)—a change of more than 500 per­
cent. Within a decade, the index ranged from
67This problem, while not dealt with in all of its aspects in this 
study, is of sufficient interest that the Iowa Agricultural Experiment 
Station is cooperating with six other Midwestern experiment stations, 
the Farm Foundation and the United States Department of Agriculture 
in a study to determine the extent and ways in which leases fail to 
provide the incentive for efficient resource use. In addition to this 
regional study, another study is nearing completion in western Iowa 
dealing with the differences in resource use on owned and rented farms.
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69 (1940) to 222 (1948)—a change of 300 per­
cent. A change of almost the same relative magni­
tude, but in the opposite direction, occurred be­
tween 1929 and 1932 when the index declined 
from 103 to 41.
Depending upon the type of lease employed, 
the production pattern of the farm firm and the 
variable and fixed cost ratios, these wide changes 
in prices can leave a substantial impact upon the 
division of net returns. The effect is most pro­
nounced in the case of the cash lease, under which 
a change in prices may reduce the tenant’s net 
income to zero and at the same time leave the 
landlord’s net relatively unchanged, with the re­
sult that net return ratio becomes infinity. Con­
versely, a rapid and unexpected rise in prices with 
no change in the contractural rent, will result in 
a windfall gain for the tenant without any change 
in the landlord’s net income, and, as a conse­
quence, the net return ratio may be substantially 
reduced.
In nearly every case, the net return ratio under 
share rental plans will be affected by changes 
in prices of farm products. In the few cases in 
which landlord and tenant share all expenses in 
the same ratio that they share total output, 
changes in prices received will not affect the di­
vision of net returns.
Provision made for changes in costs. The ne­
cessity of leasing arrangements arises from own­
ership of complementary factors of production 
residing in different individuals. One may own 
land, another may supply labor, and capital may 
be owned by either or jointly by both. The land­
lord usually supplies the land and all capital fixed 
to the land; the tenant usually supplies all or part 
of the labor; the mechinery and livestock may be 
supplied entirely by tenant or partly by the land­
lord.
Costs of supplying the contributions m a y  
change considerably and in different proportions. 
The costs of supplying land and buildings may 
not increase as rapidly as the costs of supplying 
machinery, fertilizer, tractor fuel and related 
items. The costs of supplying labor is much great­
er in periods of full employment than in periods 
during which under-employment or unemploy­
ment exists. Interest and taxes, however, respond 
slowly to changes in the business cycle. These 
differential changes in costs will result in a change 
in the division of net returns if compensating ad­
justments are not made in the lease provisions. 
A frequent complaint of tenants operating under 
a livestock-share plan pertained to increases in 
labor and machinery costs with no offsetting con­
tributions from the landlord or changes in the 
division of the output of the farm.
Provision for changes in production. Variation 
in production can affect considerably the way in 
which the returns are divided. The magnitude of 
the change in the net return ratio depends upon 
the way in which costs and returns are divided. 
In the case of the cash lease, under which the land­
lord usually receives a fixed amount of money as
rent, random changes in production affect only 
the tenant’s income. An unusually good season 
without compensating changes in prices will re­
sult in a higher net income for tenants. Converse­
ly, a poor season, without compensating changes 
in prices, may mean that the landlord will receive 
a return greater than total net income of the 
farm. Then the tenant must deplete his capital 
resources to meet the rental commitment and deny 
himself and his family a return upon the labor 
expended in the production process.
Share-type arrangements afford considerable 
protection from variations in production. But 
when costs are not shared in the same ratio as the 
returns, variation in production, without compen­
sating variations in prices, will change the net re­
turn ratio in favor of one party to the contract. 
For example, suppose the returns are divided 
evenly on a rented farm. An increase in produc­
tion, with prices remaining relatively unchanged, 
will increase the net return of the party bearing 
the larger part of the cost more, relatively, than 
the increase in net of the other party. Had pro­
duction declined, with the above conditions hold­
ing, the converse situation would have prevailed.
Provision he easily workable. Any rent-adjust­
ment plan used should be thoroughly understood 
by both parties. It is imperative that both land­
lord and tenant completely understand what the 
flexible plan will do under certain circumstances 
and the limitations^of the plan.
Plans that are based upon general levels of 
prices, costs and production depend upon the 
maintenance and availability of index series of 
these factors. The parties should assure them­
selves that the series they use in their plan is 
appropriate for their intentions and that the data 
will be available at the time they make their final 
settlement. A number of series suitable for use 
for rent-adjustment are maintained by Iowa State 
College and the Production Economics Research 
Branch, Agricultural Research Service, United 
States Department of Agriculture.
It should be further noted, of course, that any 
plan used must meet all tests of legality.
F u r t h e r  R e s e a r c h  S u g g e s t e d
Two major lines of farm rental research are 
suggested by this analysis. These lines of further 
research needed to relax certain qualifications 
imposed on the results herein presented are (1) 
analysis of effects of rental terms in the original 
agreement upon resource allocation from view­
points of landlord, tenant and the public, and (2) 
further refinements in limits of tolerance and 
further testing of rental adjustment alternatives 
in terms of meeting the tests of limits of toler­
ance and efficient resources allocation.
These two lines of continuing study emerge 
from two basic hypotheses posed by this study. 
First, in using the “ rent norm” concept, this 
study accepted the ratio of rent to net returns 
resulting from the original agreement between 
landlord and tenant. The basis for this acceptance
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was the apparent satisfaction with the rental 
terms by both parties; otherwise they would not 
have agreed to these terms. For purposes of 
this study, the rent norm concept proved to be 
a useful tool in measuring permissible and non- 
permissible variations in the net returns ratios 
resulting from factors beyond the control of the 
two parties. Likewise, the rent norm provides a 
criterion for testing alternative rent adjustment 
provisions designed to keep rents within certain 
limits desired by the two contracting parties. 
However, this study did not determine the effects 
of rental terms upon efficiency of resource use 
from individual or public viewpoints. Nor did it 
assume that landlord and tenant satisfaction with 
the ratio of net returns resulting from the orig­
inal terms of the lease, indicated that the re­
sources committed under the lease were used in 
the most efficient way. This study was concerned 
with analysis of (1) reasons why net return ratios 
depart from rent norms because of factors be­
yond the control of either landlord or tenant and 
(2) alternative rent-adjustment techniques for 
keeping net return ratios from fluctuating beyond 
certain limits. The task of analyzing the effects 
of rental terms in the original agreement upon 
resource allocation in terms of efficiency remains 
to be done.
Important groundwork for proceeding with this 
line of study has been laid in the regional leasing 
project recently completed.68, The next step is 
being taken in a regional study designed to de­
termine the relative efficiencies of alternative 
tenure arrangements upon resource use.69 Cur-
68Virgil L. Hurlburt. Farm rental practices and problems in the 
Midwest. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bui. 416. 1954. North Central Re- 
gional Publication No. 50. North Central Land Tenure Research Com­
mittee.
69This study is being undertaken by the North Central Land Tenure 
Research Committee and initial phases are underway by the Agricultural 
Experiment Stations of Missouri. Iowa, Nebraska and Kansas with the 
Agricultural Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture; 
arm Foundation and University of Chicago cooperating.
rent phases are concerned with analyzing a limit­
ed number of forms of tenure in a few selected 
areas. Based upon the results of these initial 
phases, an extended application of the analysis 
to cover additional tenure forms in other areas 
throughout the North-Central Region appears to 
be in order.
The second line of continuing research suggest­
ed by this study involves further refinements in 
limits of tolerance, coupled with further testing 
of rental adjustments in terms of tolerance limits 
and resource efficiency. The study revealed that 
whenever ratios of net returns departed from rent 
norms in an appreciable degree, individual land­
lords and tenants resorted to various devices to 
remedy the departures. Some of these devices 
yielded satisfactory results; others failed. From 
the results of this study, it is not possible to de­
limit limits of tolerance in relation to rent norms 
that apply generally to all rental arrangements. 
Further research is needed to determine the 
feasibility o f developing such generalizations. 
Also, in connection with the research suggested 
above, rent adjustment alternatives should be 
tested in terms of effects upon the efficiency of 
resource use. Further studies should also be con­
cerned with analyzing and developing additional 
rent adjustment alternatives to compensate for 
changes resulting from factors beyond the control 
of landlord and tenant, including price, cost and 
production changes. This study indicates that im­
portant idea “ seedbeds” for developing such al­
ternatives are:
(1) The numerous arrangements with which 
Midwest landlords and tenants are continuously 
experimenting and
(2) The experiences of other countries with 
similar problems and comparable frameworks for 
their solutions.
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Source : Columns 1, 2 and 3 from: Indexes of prices received by Iowa 
farmers for farm commodities sold at local markets, ( Rev. ) Iowa Crop 
and Livestock Reporting Service, U. S. Dept. Agr. and Iowa Dept.
A Column 4 from: Price trends as related to agriculture in Iowa. Iowa 
State Bui. 92-2. Iowa Dept. Agr. 1939; and Iowa farm prices and 
indexes. Mimeo. Iowa Dept. Agr. and Bureau of Agricultural Eco-
n°C1oTumif 5 SfromP U. AS.rb lp t5' of Agr. Yearbook of agriculture, 1935. 
Table 478; and Agricultural finance review. Vol. 15, Supplement L 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Dept. Agr. May *®53- TJ g 
Column 6, 1910-47 from: Farm real estate situation, 1946-47. U . b .  
Dept. Agr. Cir. 780, 1948; 1948-53 from comparable unpublished data 
compiled in Bureau of Agricultural Economics.
APPENDIX B
SAMPLE LEASE PROVISIONS
Sample lease provisions are included in this ap­
pendix to illustrate how some of the techniques 
of rent adjustment may be incorporated in the 
lease form.1 These provisions are grouped ac­
cording to adjustments for (1) changes in prices, 
(2) changes in production, (3) combined changes 
in prices and production and (4) changes in costs.
P r o v is io n s  f o r  A d j u s t i n g  R e n t  f o r  C h a n g e s  
i n  P r ic e s
Sample lease provisions for two plans for ad­
justing rents for changes in prices are presented 
below. These provisions illustrate the Iowa plan 
and the Missouri multiple commodity plan, dis­
cussed earlier in the bulletin.
IOWA FLEXIBLE CASH RENT
Section I. Base Period and Base Rent Agreed Upon.
It is agreed that, with prices of farm  products as they
were during the year (or years) ------------------- the fair cash
rental for this farm  was $_____________ per acre. The fore­
going will constitute the base period and base cash rent 
to be used in this lease. During the foregoing base year 
(or years) the official index of Iowa farm product prices 
as shown in Iowa Farm Science was as follows:
Y  ear Index
19_____________ •___ ___________________




19________________  ________ - __________
19________________  ______________  '
19________________  _______ ____ S ____ _
Total ______________,_____
Average ____________________
This means that with the official Iowa farm  price index
a t _______ !_________a fair rental for this farm  is $___________
per acre. I f  the index base is changed during the period 
of this lease, a corresponding change in the lease will be 
effective.
Section II. Amount of Rental.
The tenant shall pay to the owner, as rent per acre for 
the above described farm, an amount proportional to the 
simple average of the monthly index numbers of the 
prices received for Iowa farm  products for the 11 months 
of March through January inclusive, of the lease year 
in question, as published in the March issue of Iowa Farm  
Science, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa.2
Therefore, if the simple average of the index numbers 
of the prices of Iowa farm products for the 11 months 
specified above is:
331-340 the rental shall be $ per acre
321-330 the rental shall be $ per acre
311-320 the rental shall be $ per acre
301-310 the rental shall be $ per acre
291-300 the rental shall be $ per acre
281-290 the rental shall be $ per acre
271-280 the rental shall be $ per acre
261-270 the rental shall be % per acre
251-260 the rental shall be $ per acre
iFarm lease forms, including: provisions for flexible rents, are ob­
tainable from Iowa State College and the United States Department of 
Agriculture.
2This average index is based upon the prices of Iowa farm products 
computed by the Iowa Crop and Livestock Reporting Service and pub­
lished in the February issue of Iowa Farm Science.
241-250 the rental shall be $ per acre
231-240 the rental shall be $ per acre
221-230 the rental shall be 1 per acre
211-220 the rental shall be $ per acre
201-210 the rental shall be $ per acre
191-200 the rental shall be $ per acre
181-190 the rental shall be $ ■ per acre
171-180 the rental shall be $ per acre
161-170 the rental shall be $ per acre
151-160 the rental shall be $ per acre
141-150 the rental shall be 1 per acre
131-140 the rental shall be $ per acre
121-130 the rental shall be $ per acre
111-120 the rental shall be $ per acre
101-110 the rental shall be $ per acre
91-100 the rental shall be $ per acre
81- 90 the rental shall be $ per acre
71- 80 the rental shall be $ per acre
61- 70 the rental shall be $ per acre
51- 60 the rental shall be S per acre
To make the calculations necessary to fill out the sched-
ule above, use the following equation:
Average price indeix 
this past year 
(Iowa Farm Science) 
Average price index 
in base period 
(Section I)






X Number of acres 
in farms







The rental shall be paid in two installments, the first
being due and payable on --------------------  (month and day)
_____________ each year, in a fixed amount of $---------------------- ;
the second due on February 15 of the lease year for which 
the rent is due. The amount due and payable February 
15 shall be the full rental for the period of the lease as 
computed according to the table above, less any install­
ment or installments previously paid. Payments of above 
rent are to be made by the tenant or his heirs or assigns 
to the owner or his heirs or assigns at the owner’s resi­
dence shown above.
MISSOURI MULTIPLE COMMODITY PLAN
(1) It is agreed that the base rent for the above-de­
scribed real property shall be $_____________ , for the period
startin g_________________, 19___ , and ending__________
19___
(2) It is agreed that a factor for adjusting the rental 
payment shall be computed in the following manner:
(a) That, on this day, the parties have entered in 
column II of the attached schedule their mutually ac­
ceptable estimates o f the income to be obtained from  
each enterprise shown in column I.
(b) That the parties have, on this day, entered in 
column III o f the attached schedule mutually accept­
able base prices for the commodities produced by each 
enterprise shown in column I.
(c) That the parties agree to accept the following 
market quotations as final prices to be entered in column 
IV  of the attached schedule.
Commodity Grade Market Date
Hogs __________ _________ - 1 . V '
Beef ________ _ _________ _ _________ .
Butterfat __________ ' __________
Eggs --------- ------ , ---------------
(d) That each price in column IV  will be expressed 
as a ratio of the corresponding price in column III and 
entered in column V.
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Accepted ratio of final price to base price
XXX XXX XXX
Column VI
Estimated income revised by changes in prices
'
Rent correction factor =
Sum column VI 
Sum column II
I
(e) That each ratio in column V  will be multiplied 
by the corresponding income estimate appearing in 
column II and the result will be entered in column V I.
(f )  That the ratio of the sum of column V I to the 
sum of column II be determined.
(3) The parties agree that the rent due and payable 
shall be the base rent as shown in Section 1 multiplied 
by the ratio determined in Section 2-f.
(4) It is further agreed that — .---------- percent of the
base rent shall be paid on g------------------------- , 19— , and dif­
ference between the rent due on the above day and the 
total rent due and payable as determined in Section 3 
shall be paid on ------------------------- , 19.-----
P r o v is io n s  f o r  A d j u s t i n g  R e n t  f o r  C h a n g e s  
i n  P r o d u c t io n
Lease provisions for two plans for adjusting 
the rent on the basis of changes in production are 
presented below. These plans are based upon work 
done at the Iowa and Missouri Experiment Sta­
tions ; the Iowa plan and the Missouri plan have 
been discussed earlier in this bulletin.
IOWA PLAN
This lease provision was originally developed 
to improve the operation of the Iowa flexible cash 
lease and, when used in connection with the flexi­
ble lease, results in a rent completely flexible with 
respect to prices and partially flexible with re­
spect to production. But there is no reason why 
this provision cannot be used in conjunction with 
a fixed cash rent to make the rent respond to a 
severe change in production.
O W N E R  A N D  T E N A N T  BOTH A G R E E :
1. I f  in any given lease year there is, on the average 
for all of the land in corn on this farm , 75 percent or less 
of a normal corn yield, then whatever percent of a normal 
corn yield per acre there is on the above acreage, only 
that same percent of the cash rent as calculated by the 
foregoing method will be due; (except that in any event 
the tenant must pay a cash rental equal to the real estate 
tax bill for the 1 year in question).
Both parties agree t h a t __________bushels per acre is the
normal corn yield for this farm.
Exam ple: Suppose it is mutually agreed that the aver- 
age corn yield on this farm  is 60 bushels per acre. The 
average yield on this farm  this year, however, is 40 bush­
els or 67 percent of a normal yield. If the cash rent as 
computed by the flexible-cash method turns out to be $9 
per acre, then the rent actually due will be 67 percent 
of $9, or $6 per acre in this year of partial crop failure.3
3Prepared by I. W- Arthur for use in “ Iowa farm lease—flexible cash 
rent.”  Iowa Agricultural Extension Service, Ames, Iowa.
MISSOURI PLAN
The following lease provision can be used to 
correct rent for production changes without cor­
recting for price changes. If this type of limited 
correction is desired, the landlord and  ^tenant 
should consider the prices current at the time the 
lease is drawn in the last column of the table in 
Section 5 and strike out the market, grade and 
date columns. These prices may also be entered in 
column VII of the schedule for determining rent 
due and payable at the time the contract is drawn.
The lease provision follows:
M e t h o d  o f  A d j u s t i n g  C a s h  R e n t  o n  t h e  B a s is  
o f  S t a t e  C h a n g e s  i n  P r o d u c t io n
(1) The parties agree that the land in the above- 
described tract of real property will be used as shown in 
column II of the attached schedule.
(2) The parties agree that the basic rental shares
will be as shown in column III of the attached schedule. I
(3) The parties agree that normal yields for this
property are as shown in column IV  of the attached sched- 
ule. .
(4) The parties agree that the average yields for 
Iowa, as published by the state statistician, for the period
_________ ■ to ____________ , constitute the normal yields
for the State of Iowa and are shown in column V  of the 
attached schedule.
(5) The parties agree to use the following market 
quotations or prices in determining the rent of this tract:
Market Grade Date Price
Corn --------------  --------------  ----------- — --------------
W heat ________—  ---------------  ------- -------  -------------- -
Oats ---------------  ---------------  — :----------  ------------ —
Soybeans ----------—  — -----------  — ----------- —----------------
Hay — ------- — ------------- - ---------------  ---------------
(If rent is to be adjusted for production changes only, 
complete the last column using current prices and delete 
the market, grade and date columns. I f  lease is to be 
used to adjust rent for both price and production changes, 
complete the market, grade and date columns and strike 
out the price column.)
The parties further agree that rent per acre of pasture 
land, the total rent for pasture land and the total rent 
for buildings are as shown in columns IX  and X  of the 
attached schedule.
(6) The parties agree that the rent will be computed 
at the end of the term in thè following manner:
(a) That the average yields for the state for the 
current crop year, as published by the state statis­
tician, will be entered appropriately in column V I.
(b) That each yield in column V I will be expressed
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as a ratio o f the yield shown in column V , and that this 
ratio will be multiplied times the yield shown in column 
IV  and the result entered appropriately in column V III.
(c) That the prices obtained in Section 5 be entered 
appropriately in column V II and each price in column 
VII be multiplied by the yield appearing in column V III  
and that the result be entered in column IX .
(d) That each item in column IX  multiplied by the 
corresponding item in column III and the result be 
entered in column X .
(e) That column X  be summed.
(7) The parties agree that the rent due and payable
on ------------------------- , 19— , shall be the sum computed in
6-e above.
P l a n s  f o r  A d j u s t i n g  R e n t  f o r  C h a n g e s  i n  
P r ic e s  a n d  P r o d u c t io n
A number of methods exist for adjusting rent 
for both changes in prices and production. These 
methods represent modifications and combina­
tions of the lease provisions presented in the sec­
tions dealing with adjustments for changes in 
prices and adjustments for changes in production.
IOWA PLAN
A lease provision that will adjust the rent on 
the basis of changes in prices and certain types 
of changes in production can be constructed by 
inserting the Iowa provision for crop failure into 
the Iowa flexible rent provision above. The logi­
cal point of insertion is immediately following 
the formula for the determination of rent for 
varying price conditions.
As pointed out in the discussion, this crop- 
failure provision is one-sided and can provide a 
rather abrupt and drastic change in the rent due. 
If it is desired to approximate the adjustment 
technique discussed on pages 110-113, where the 
rent would be adjusted for both unusual increases 
and decreases in production and transferring the 
return or cost of management to the tenant, the 
following lease provision may be inserted in the 
Iowa flexible form immediately following the 
formula for computing the rent due:
It is further agreed that the rent will be increased if 
the average yield of corn for Iowa, for this crop year, as 
published by the state statistician, exceeds 115 percent of 
the average of the average Iowa corn yields for the 5 
crop years immediately preceding the crop year covered 
by this contract by multiplying the rent as determined 
above by the following ratio:
Average yield of Iowa corn this crop year/115 per­
cent of the average Iowa corn yields for the 5 previous 
years.
It is agreed that the rent will be decreased if the aver­
age Iowa corn yield for this crop year, as published by the 
state statistician, is less than 85 percent of the average 
of the average corn yields for the 5 crop years immediate­
ly preceding the crop-year covered by this contract by 
multiplying the rent as determined above by the following 
ratio:
Average yield of Iowa corn this year year/85 per­
cent of the average of the average Iowa corn yields for  
5 previous crop years.
The average yields of corn for Iowa for the 5 previous 






The Missouri plan for adjusting for changes in 
production will automatically adjust for prices if 
the prices prevailing at the time the commodities 
are sold, or the approximation of these prices, 
are used. One method of accomplishing this is for 
the landlord and tenant to agree to accept, at the 
time the contract is drawn, prices prevailing for 
specified grades at specified markets (may be 
local) on specified days. The use of this method 
of determining prices to be used in the rent de­
termination is provided for in Section 5 of the 
lease provision presented above. The landlord 
and tenant should complete the first four columns 
of Section 5 and strike out the last column.
An alternative to this would be to use a weight­
ed average of prices received for actual market­
ings—dividing total receipts from the sales from 
each enterprise by the number of units sold dur­
ing the period covered by the contract.
A d j u s t i n g  R e n t  f o r  C h a n g e s  i n  C o s t s
While various devices may be developed for ad­
justing rents for changes in prices and produc­
tion, adjustments for changing costs along with 
changing prices offers a much larger problem. 
The share-rent approach completely adjusts the 
rent for changes in prices and production and 
thus stabilizes the division of gross returns. Sim­
ilar techniques have been devised and presented 
in this bulletin that would stabilize the cash rent 
relative to gross return—this is possible as the 
gross return is determined by multiplying prices
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\and production. As these prices and production 
vary, it is possible to determine how much the 
rent must be varied to keep the ratio constant. 
To determine the net return, however, costs must 
be subtracted out. This makes the advance de­
termination of any factor that will stabilize the 
division of net returns exceedingly difficult. No 
technique was found in the literature or in prac­
tice, or was developed in this study which would 
with certainty in the ex ante sense, assure the 
parties that changing costs would not affect the 
return ratio. While the mechanism of the method
that must be used (if complete adjustment for 
changes in prices, costs and production is to be 
achieved) has been presented in this report, to 
have utility it must rest upon the use of several 
series of index numbers. Unless each of these 
series approximate the actual conditions that exist 
on the farm where the adjustment method is being 
used, the plan may increase the variability rather 
than contribute to its stability. For this reason, 
and considering the stage of development of the 
method, which requires further study, a sample 
lease provision is not included.
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